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Moving from Crisis Management 
to a Sustainable Solution for 
Somali Piracy: Selected 
Initiatives and the Role of 
International Law 
Ved P. Nanda* & Jonathan Bellish† 
Since 2012 a sharp decline in Somali piracy has occurred, 
primarily due to proactive naval actions from many countries 
and the shipping industry’s preventive measures by 
implementing best management practices and the employment of 
private armed guards.  In addition, numerous international 
organizations have been actively engaged in the complex process 
of combating piracy.  But the underlying causes of piracy—such 
as poverty and unemployment among youth, coupled with the 
political, economic, and security problems in Somalia—persist.  
Hence, maritime piracy continues to be a global nuisance.  
Several states and international organizations are also engaged 
in the prosecution of pirates, which is an immense logistical and 
legal challenge, especially the prosecution of pirate leaders and 
financiers of piracy groups who constitute part of the land-based 
criminal networks and reside outside Somalia.  The ongoing 
regulation of private maritime security companies by 
international, national, and non-governmental entities also 
presents an equally important challenge, as the security 
companies aspire to meet the twin objectives of ensuring the 
effective provision of maritime security and protecting the lives 
of innocent civilians who might be mistaken for pirates or 
otherwise get caught in the crossfire.  As cost-effective 
suppression at sea continues, the transition must be to a 
sustainable solution on shore that can be accomplished with 
capacity-building measures.  These include creating economic 
opportunities within Somalia and enhancing the rule of law 
along the Somali coastline.  Otherwise, the hard-fought gains 
made to date could be reversed. 
 
* Ved P. Nanda is Evans University Professor, University of Denver, and 
Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm 
College of Law. 
† Jonathan Bellish is a Project Officer at Oceans Beyond Piracy and a 
Fellow of the Nanda Center for International and Comparative Law, 
University of Denver Sturm College of Law. 
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I.  Introduction 
Notwithstanding a sharp decline in Somali piracy since 2012, 
maritime piracy continues to be an ongoing global threat to 
international navigation, trade, and maritime and regional security. 
Efforts to combat this menace include concerted action by several 
international organizations, including the United Nations (U.N.), 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Union (EU), 
African Union (AU), and the League of Arab States. More than 
forty countries are also involved in undertaking operations on their 
own or through the following coalitions: the European Union Naval 
Force Somalia through Operation Atalanta, the Standing Naval 
Group of NATO through Operation Ocean Shield, and the Combined 
Task Force 151. 
In 2009, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia 
(CGPCS) was established to coordinate several international 
organizations and countries engaged in preventing piracy. A number 
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of other international, regional, and national initiatives, such as the 
Djibouti Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy and 
Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the 
Gulf of Aden (“Djibouti Code of Conduct”), and the Indian Ocean 
Commission Anti-Piracy Partnership Program, also complement the 
international efforts. The shipping industry, which is burdened with 
the spiraling costs of piracy, has also taken preventive steps by 
complying with the Best Management Practices for Protection 
Against Somalia Based Piracy,1 (BMP) and, with the help of private 
maritime security companies (PMSCs), is actively engaged in 
combating piracy.  
All these efforts have resulted in an effective response to fight 
Somali piracy, but as the recent 2013 World Bank Report, The 
Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding a Nation,2 aptly 
warns, “the long-term solution to piracy off the Horn of Africa cannot 
be dissociated from the construction of a Somali state that is viable at 
both central and local levels.”3 
While the scope of this article is limited to a discussion of the 
challenges the international community faces in combating Somali 
piracy, it is worth noting here that the scourge of global piracy 
demands long-term and persistent efforts to prevent, deter, and 
combat this ongoing threat. In Part II we review the nature and scope 
of the menace, while Part III studies the role of international 
organizations to meet the piracy challenge. Part IV outlines the 
United States’ counter-piracy efforts. Parts V and VI discuss two 
issues that will play an important role in transitioning from crisis-
management to a sustainable solution to maritime piracy, with Part 
V focusing on the importance of effectively regulating PMSCs, and 
Part VI describing ongoing efforts to establish Somalia’s exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ). Part VII analyzes the applicable legal 
 
1. BMP 4: BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR PROTECTION AGAINST 
SOMALI BASED PIRACY (2011) [hereinafter BMP4], available at 
http://www.mschoa.org/docs/public-documents/bmp4_low_res_sep_ 
5_2011.pdf. These practices are developed by the industry group and, at 
the request of the International Chamber of Shipping, the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), circulated the document. See Int’l 
Maritime Org. [IMO], Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in 
Waters off the Coast of Somalia, Best Management Practices for 
Protection Against Somalia Based Piracy, Annex 2, MSC.1/Circ.1339 
(Sept. 14, 2011).  
2. THE WORLD BANK, THE PIRATES OF SOMALIA: ENDING THE THREAT, 
REBUILDING A NATION (2013), available at http://www-wds. 
worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/0
5/06/000333037_20130506120556/Rendered/PDF/767130WP0REPLA0
alia0main0report0web.pdf [hereinafter WORLD BANK REPORT]. 
3. Id. at xxv. 
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framework, and Part VIII provides some recommendations based on 
our research and analysis. Part IX then concludes. 
II.  The Nature and Scope of the Menace of Piracy: 
Current Trends 
The Piracy Reporting Center of the International Maritime 
Bureau (IMB), a division of the International Chamber of Commerce, 
and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), both issue piracy 
reports. The IMB reports for 2012 show a sharp decline in attacks 
compared with those of prior years, from 410 incidents in 2009, 445 in 
2010, and 439 in 2011, to 297 in 2012.4 What is striking, however, is 
that Somalia, as the location of actual and attempted attacks, showed 
49 such attacks in 2012 as compared with 80 attacks in 2009, 139 in 
2010, and 160 in 2011.5 IMB’s updated report shows only nine 
Somalia-related incidents, including two hijackings, from January 1, 
2013 through July 15, 2013.6 Similarly, such attacks in the Gulf of 
Aden diminished from 117 in 2009 to 53 in 2010, 37 in 2011, and 13 in 
2012.7  
Effective counter-piracy operations by naval forces and PMSCs in 
the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia may have resulted in 
diminished pirate activity in East Africa, but the diminished activity 
has coincided with a rise in maritime crime in West Africa. To 
illustrate, attempts off the coast of Nigeria increased from 10 in 2011 
to 27 in 2012 and from 6 to 15 off the coast of Togo in the span of 
one year.8 As of July 15, 2013, Nigeria-related incidents numbered 22, 
 
4. ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS: 
REPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY – 31 DECEMBER 2012, at 5-6 (2013) 
[hereinafter IMB 2012 ANNUAL REPORT]. While exhibiting the same 
decline in piracy incidents, the numbers given by IMO differ, as for 2012 
its number of reported piracy incidents was 341, compared with 544 
reported incidents in 2011. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Reports on Acts 
of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report – 2012, at 
2, MSC.4/Circ.193 (Apr. 2, 2013) [hereinafter IMO 2012 Annual 
Report].  
5. IMB 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5. 
6. Piracy and Armed Robbery News and Figures, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME 
SERVS. (July 15, 2013), http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/ 
piracynewsafigures [hereinafter ICC July 2013 Report]. 
7. IMB 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 5. 
8. Of the twenty-seven Nigeria incidents, four vessels were hijacked, 
thirteen boarded, eight fired upon, and two were attempted attacks. 
Piracy Falls in 2012, But Seas off East and West Africa Remain 
Dangerous, Says IMB, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVS. (Jan. 16, 2013), 
http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/836-piracy-falls-in-2012-but-seas-off-east-
and-west-africa-remain-dangerous-says-imb [hereinafter Piracy Falls in 
2012].  
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including one hijacking.9 The IMO’s 2012 Annual Report also shows a 
dramatic decline in the number of Somalia-based piracy attacks from 
286 incidents in 2011 to 99 incidents in 2012, while the number of 
attacks in West Africa increased from 61 incidents in 2011 to 64 in 
2012.10 
During the first six months of 2013, the IMB Piracy Reporting 
Center recorded 138 incidents, including seven hijackings worldwide, a 
decrease from 177 such incidents, including 20 hijackings in the first 
half of 2012. 11 One hundred twenty-seven sailors were taken hostage 
during the first half of 2013, compared with 334 sailors in the same 
period of 2012.12 However, in the Gulf of Guinea, the number of 
piracy incidents, including hijackings, has increased along with the 
number of kidnappings, and “a wider range of ship types [are] being 
targeted,” which the report considers to be “a new cause for concern 
in a region already known for attacks against vessels in the oil 
industry and theft of gas oil from tankers.”13 Armed pirates in the 
Gulf of Guinea took 56 sailors hostage and kidnapped 30 crew 
members, killing one person and injuring another five in the first half 
of 2013.14 Further, as of June 30, 2013, Somali pirates were holding 
57 crew members for ransom on four vessels and 11 kidnapped crew 
members on land.15 The IMO’s Global Integrated Shipping 
Information System report of recent incidents from April 2013 to July 
2013 shows a similar pattern to that occurring in the Gulf of Guinea, 
with more such incidents taking place in West Africa and the South 
China Sea.16  
Outside of East and West Africa, Indonesia recorded the highest 
number of attacks—81 in 2012, with 73 vessels boarded and 47 crew 
members taken hostage—accounting for more than a quarter of global 
incidents that year. These attacks in Southeast Asia have increased 
 
9. ICC July 2013 Report, supra note 6. 
10. IMO 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2. 
11. IMB Piracy Report Highlights Violence in West Africa, ICC 
COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVS. (July 15, 2013), http://www.icc-
ccs.org/news/865-imb-piracy-report-highlights-violence-in-west-africa 
[hereinafter IMB July 15 Report]. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. See Piracy and Armed Robbery – Recent Incidents, GLOBAL 
INTEGRATED SHIPPING INFO. SYS., http://gisis.imo.org/Public/Default. 
aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
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every year since 2009.17 During the first half of 2013, Indonesia 
accounted for 48 attacks, with 43 vessels boarded.18  
Current trends indicate the need for concerted and coordinated 
international, regional, bilateral, national, and industry efforts to 
combat global piracy. The underlying causes of piracy persist: poverty 
and unemployment in Somalia, especially among the youth, coupled 
with the complex security, political, economic, and cultural landscape 
of the country and the need for a functioning government with 
effective rule of law, which has yet to be realized. Consequently, the 
Somali piracy threat, though diminished, still remains grave, as on 
April 15, 2013, the IMB reported an incident up to 400 nautical miles 
east of Mogadishu.19 
Commenting on the recent reduction in Somali piracy attacks, 
IMB Director Pottengal Mukundan aptly stated: 
Although the number of acts of piracy reported in Somalia has 
significantly decreased, there can be no room for complacency. 
The drop in reported attacks is due to proactive naval actions 
against suspect Pirate Action Groups, the employment of 
privately contracted armed security personnel and the 
preventive measures used by the merchant vessels (as per latest 
Best Management Practices recommendations). The attacks will 
rise to past levels if the naval presence is reduced or vessels 
relax their vigilance.20 
BMP21—which is now in its fourth version—has been effective in 
deterring pirate attacks and should be continued. BMP measures 
include “a proactive 24 hour lookout; reporting suspicious activities to 
authorities; removing access ladders; protecting the lowest points of 
access; the use of deck lighting, netting, razor wire, electrical fencing, 
fire hoses and surveillance and detection equipment; engaging in 
evasive maneuvering and speed during a pirate attack; and joining 
group transits.”22 
 
17. Piracy Falls in 2012, supra note 8. 
18. IMB July 15 Report, supra note 11. 
19. IMB Advises Continued Vigilance as Maritime Piracy Attacks Decline, 
ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVS. (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.icc-
ccs.org/news/841-imb-advises-continued-vigilance-as-maritime-piracy-
attacks-decline. 
20. Id.  
21. BMP4, supra note 1.  
22. CTF-151: Counter-Piracy, COMBINED MAR. FORCES, http://combined 
maritimeforces.com/ctf-151-counter-piracy/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
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III.  The Role of International Organizations 
Numerous international organizations have been involved in the 
complex process of combating piracy. Only a few selected ones will be 
covered here. These are: (A) the U.N. Secretary-General and Security 
Council; (B) the IMO; (C) NATO; (D) the EU; (E) CGPCS; (F) 
Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151); and (G) the U.N. Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 
A.  The U.N. Secretary-General and Security Council 
The U.N. Secretary-General regularly issues statements pursuant 
to requests from the Security Council and General Assembly and 
presents periodic reports addressing key developments in piracy off 
the coast of Somalia. To illustrate, on June 26, 2013, 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon welcomed the successful conclusion of 
the Summit of the Gulf of Guinea Heads of State and Government on 
Maritime Safety and Security, and the adoption by the summit 
leaders of the regional strategy against piracy in West and Central 
Africa.23 The summit included member states of the region, the 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the 
Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC).24 At the meeting, participants 
adopted the Code of Conduct Concerning the Prevention and 
Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships and Illegal 
Maritime Activities in West and Central Africa.25 Moreover, on April 
18, 2013, in a message at a conference on regional responses to global 
threats in Dubai, the Secretary-General reiterated the U.N. 
commitment to work with the international community, as well as the 
Somali authorities, to implement a comprehensive strategy for a 
sustainable solution to the menace of piracy.26  
The Secretary-General’s reports cover a wide range of issues 
related to piracy, including major developments.27 For example, on 
 
23. Ban Welcomes Anti-Piracy Strategy Adopted by Leaders from West, 
Central Africa, UN NEWS CTR. (June 27, 2013), http://www.un.org/ 
apps/news/printnewsAr.asp?nid=45281. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Holistic Anti-Piracy Efforts Must 
Be Woven into Overall Solution for Somalia, U.N. Press Release 
SG/SM/13511, AFR/2165 (Apr. 18, 2011). 
27. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on 
Somalia, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/2012/643 (Aug. 22, 2012); U.N. 
Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 1897 (2009), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/2010/556 (Oct. 27, 
2010). 
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October 22, 2012, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reported on 
international and regional cooperative measures taken by 
international organizations and Member States, including naval 
activities off the coast of Somalia, legal issues such as prosecution, 
detention, and prisoner transfers, the root causes of piracy off the 
coast of Somalia, and the Trust Fund to Support Initiatives of States 
Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (“Trust Fund”).28  
The Secretary-General has reported on specific issues including 
the Trust Fund; the possible options to further the aim of prosecuting 
and imprisoning persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed 
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia;29 the modalities for the 
establishment of specialized Somali anti-piracy courts;30 the legal 
issues related to piracy off the coast of Somalia;31 and specialized anti-
piracy courts in Somalia and other states in the region.32 
Having declared piracy off the coast of Somalia a “threat to 
international peace and security” under Chapter VII of the U.N. 
Charter in 2008,33 the Security Council has since adopted several 
resolutions to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea. Resolution 
2077 adopted on November 21, 2012, renewed for one year the 
Security Council’s authorization to Member States and regional 
organizations cooperating with Somali authorities to take action 
against pirates in Somalia’s coastal and territorial waters.34 Resolution 
 
28. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 2020 (2011), ¶¶ 20–22, 33–39, 44–58, U.N. 
Doc. S/2012/783 (Oct. 22, 2012) [hereinafter SG’s Oct. 2012 Report]. 
29. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on Possible 
Options to Further the Aim of Prosecuting and Imprisoning Persons 
Responsible for Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea off the Coast 
of Somalia, U.N. Doc. S/2010/394 (July 26, 2010) [hereinafter Possible 
Options Report]. 
30. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Modalities 
for the Establishment of Specialized Somali Anti-Piracy Courts, U.N. 
Doc. S/2011/360 (June 15, 2011). 
31. Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to 
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, Annex Rep. to the Letter dated Jan. 
24, 2011 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security 
Council, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. S/2011/30 (Jan. 25, 2011) (by Jack Lang) 
[hereinafter Lang Report]. 
32. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on Specialized 
Anti-Piracy Courts in Somalia and Other States in the Region, U.N. 
Doc. S/2012/50 (Jan. 20 2012).  
33. S.C. Res. 1846, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846, at 2 (Dec. 2, 2008); see also UN 
Documents for Piracy, SEC. COUNCIL REPORT, http://www.security 
councilreport.org/un-documents/piracy/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) 
(providing a list of all resolutions). 
34. S.C. Res. 2077, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2077, at 2 (Nov. 21, 2012). For earlier 
resolutions concerning the piracy situation in Somalia, see S.C. Res. 
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1897 of November 30, 2009, further broadened the definition of piracy 
to include certain land-based operations on the Somali mainland.35 
While stressing the need for a comprehensive response from the 
international community to combat piracy and address its underlying 
causes, the Security Council, under Resolution 2077,36 underlined the 
primary responsibility of Somali authorities in the fight against piracy 
and requested them to pass a complete set of anti-piracy laws without 
further delay and to declare an EEZ in accordance with the U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).37 The Security Council 
also called on Member States to criminalize piracy under their 
domestic laws38 and reiterated its decision to continue considering the 
establishment of specialized anti-piracy courts in Somalia and other 
states in the region with substantial international participation 
and/or support.39 It also commended the establishment of the Trust 
Fund and the IMO Djibouti Code Trust Fund and urged states as 
well as non-state actors, especially the international shipping 
community, to contribute to these funds.40 
On February 29, 2012, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
2039,41 applicable only to the situation in the Gulf of Guinea—the 
region where piracy attacks had risen as the pirates shifted their 
attention to West Africa. The Council stressed the primary 
responsibility of the Gulf of Guinea states to counter piracy and urged 
them through ECCAS, ECOWAS, and the GGC to plan a joint 
summit of the Gulf of Guinea states in cooperation with the AU, to 
develop a regional anti-piracy strategy.42 Further, the Council urged 
the Gulf of Guinea states to establish “a legal framework for the 
prevention, and repression of piracy and armed robbery at sea . . . as 
well as prosecution of persons engaging in those crimes, and 
punishment of those convicted of those crimes and encourage[d] 
regional cooperation in this regard.”43   
1816, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 
33. These early resolutions were extended in 2009, 2010, and 2011. S.C. 
Res. 1897, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1897 (Nov. 30, 2009); S.C. Res. 1950, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1950 (Nov. 23, 2010); S.C. Res. 2020, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/2020 (Nov. 22, 2011). 
35. S.C. Res. 1897, supra note 34, ¶ 11. 
37. S.C. Res. 2077, supra note 34, at 1. 
37. Id. ¶ 4. 
38. Id. ¶ 18. 
39. Id. ¶ 19. 
40. Id. ¶ 26. 
41. S.C. Res. 2039, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2039 (Feb. 29, 2012).  
42. Id. ¶ 3.  
43. Id. ¶ 5.  
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In Resolution 1918, adopted on April 27, 2010, the Security 
Council called on Member States to criminalize piracy under their 
domestic laws and to favorably consider the prosecution and 
imprisonment of suspected pirates.44 The Council requested the 
Secretary-General to present a report on the following possible options 
to further the aim of prosecuting and imprisoning those responsible 
for acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia: (1) enhanced U.N. 
assistance to build the capacity of regional states to prosecute and 
imprison suspected pirates; (2) establishment of a Somali court sitting 
extraterritorially that applies Somali law, either with or without U.N. 
participation; (3) establishment of a special chamber within the 
national jurisdiction of a state or states in the region without U.N. 
participation; (4) establishment of a special chamber within the 
national jurisdiction of a state or states in the region with U.N. 
participation; (5) establishment of a regional tribunal, not embedded 
in a national jurisdiction but established on the basis of a multilateral 
agreement among regional states and with U.N. participation; (6) 
establishment of an international tribunal based on an agreement 
between the U.N. and a state in the piracy-affected region; and (7) 
establishment of an international tribunal created by a Security 
Council resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.45 As noted 
above, after extensive deliberations, the preferred solution is to 
establish specialized anti-piracy courts in Somalia and other states in 
the region.46  
In addition to the U.N. Secretary-General and Security Council, 
other entities responsible for U.N. initiatives include the General 
Assembly, which has repeatedly expressed its “grave concern” at the 
threats piracy poses;47 the IMO; UNODC; the U.N. Political Office for 
 
44. S.C. Res. 1918, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1918 (Apr. 27, 2010).  
45. Possible Options Report, supra note 29, ¶¶ 55–104. 
46. See S.C. Res. 2077, supra note 34, ¶ 19 and accompanying text (stating 
the U.N. Security Council “[r]eiterates its decision to continue its 
consideration, as a matter of urgency, of the establishment of specialized 
anti-piracy courts in Somalia and other States in the region with 
substantial international participation and/or support”).  
47. Among several annual resolutions addressing piracy, the U.N. General 
Assembly adopted G.A. Res. 67/78, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/78 (Dec. 11, 
2012). The Resolution took note of continued bilateral, trilateral and 
regional initiatives, along with the work of U.N. entities, including the 
IMO and UNODC, and the General Assembly called upon all states to 
work in cooperation with international organizations and to take 
effective action including becoming parties to the applicable 
conventions. Id. ¶¶ 92, 96. The U.N. Secretary-General presents 
periodic reports on piracy and armed robbery at sea pursuant to 
requests from the General Assembly. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, 
Oceans and the Law of the Sea, ¶¶ 102–22, U.N. Doc. A/65/69/Add.2 
(Aug. 31, 2010).  
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Somalia (UNPOS), which has acted as the U.N. focal point for efforts 
to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia and has since been replaced 
by the U.N. Assistance Mission to Somalia; the U.N. Development 
Programme; and the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
Several other U.N. entities continue to assist Somalia in building 
capacity related to human rights, security, and justice.  
B.  International Maritime Organization  
As a specialized agency of the U.N., the IMO works in 
cooperation with the shipping industry and nongovernmental 
organizations.48 It began its piracy-related activities in 1983, when the 
IMO Assembly adopted a resolution on measures to prevent acts of 
piracy and robbery against ships.49 Since then the IMO has actively 
and effectively addressed the question of maritime piracy through 
various initiatives.  
Among those initiatives was the establishment of several regional 
and sub-regional arrangements designed to prevent, deter, and repress 
piracy50: the 2007 Singapore Statement, resulting from the IMO’s 
efforts to improve maritime security, safety, and environmental 
protection in the Strait of Malacca in Singapore;51 the 2008 
Sub-Regional Coast Guard Network for the West and Central African 
regions, under the auspices of the Maritime Organization for West 
and Central Africa;52 and the 2009 Djibouti Code of Conduct.53  
 
48. See Introduction to IMO, INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.IMO.org/ 
About/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) (giving a brief 
history of the IMO and its connection to the shipping industry).  
49. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Measures to Prevent Acts of Piracy and 
Armed Robbery Against Ships, IMO Assemb. Res. A. 545 (13) (Nov. 17, 
1983). 
50. See, e.g., Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and 
Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia art. 2(1), Nov. 11, 2004, 2398 
U.N.T.S. 199 (entered into force Sept. 4, 2006) (“The Contracting 
Parties shall, in accordance with their respective national laws and 
regulations and subject to their available resources or capabilities, 
implement this Agreement, including preventing and suppressing piracy 
and armed robbery against ships, to the fullest extent possible.”). 
51. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Singapore Statement on Enhancement of 
Safety, Security and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca 
and Singapore, IMO/SGP 1/4 (Sept. 6, 2007) (stating “[t]he purpose of 
the Singapore Meeting was to provide a follow-up forum to build on the 
outcome of the Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: 
Enhancing Safety, Security and Environmental Protection”). 
52. See Alain Michel Luvambano, The Great Maritime Appointments, MAR. 
ORG. OF W. & CENTRAL AFR., http://www.omaoc.org/EN/texte.php 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
53. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression 
of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Western Indian 
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Since 2009, the IMO has also taken the initiative to draft a set of 
guidelines for effectively fighting piracy. Specifically, following 
counter-piracy efforts in 2009, the IMO adopted a guidance document 
called the Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes and Piracy 
and Armed Robbery Against Ships, which was aimed at fostering 
regional cooperation and coordinating governments’ actions.54 In 
September 2011, the IMO circulated the fourth version of the BMP 
document for the protection against Somali-based piracy.55 
In 2011, the legal committee of the IMO also provided useful 
information and guidance on elements of international law relating to 
piracy,56 including the key piracy provisions of UNCLOS,57 the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety 
of Maritime Navigation (“1988 SUA Convention”)58 that complements 
the universal jurisdiction provisions of UNCLOS, and other pertinent 
conventions. Among the IMO’s 2012 initiatives were recommendations 
 
Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, ¶ 7, IMO Council Doc. C 102/14 (Apr. 3, 
2009), available at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PIU/ 
Documents/DCoC%20English.pdf. 
54. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Code of Practice for the Investigation of 
Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, ¶ 4, IMO Assemb. 
Res. A. 1025 (26) (Dec. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Code of Practice]. 
55. BMP4, supra note 1; IMO, supra note 1. 
56. See Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Circular Letter Concerning Information 
and Guidance on Elements of International Law Relating to Piracy, 
IMO Circular Letter No. 3180 (May 17, 2011). This document’s annex 
contains the following additional documents: (1) IMO, Piracy: Elements 
of National Legislation Pursuant to the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, 1982, IMO Legal Comm. Doc. LEG 98/8/1, LEG 
98/8/3 (Feb. 18, 2011) (submitted by the U.N. Division for Ocean 
Affairs and the Law of the Sea); (2) IMO, Piracy: Establishment of a 
Legislative Framework to Allow for Effective and Efficient Piracy 
Prosecutions, IMO Legal Comm. Doc. LEG 98/8/2 (Feb. 18, 2011) 
(submitted by UNODC); (3) IMO, Piracy: Uniform and Consistent 
Application of the Provisions of International Conventions Relating to 
Piracy, IMO Legal Comm. Doc. LEG 98/8 (Feb. 18, 2011)(submitted by 
the IMO Secretariat); and (4) IMO, Establishment of a Legislative 
Framework to Allow for Effective and Efficient Piracy Prosecutions, 
IMO Legal Comm. Doc. LEG 98/8/4 (Feb. 25, 2011) (submitted by 
Ukraine). 
57. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 100–07, open for signature 
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
58. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety 
of Maritime Navigation art. 6, opened for signature Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 
U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Mar. 1, 1992) [hereinafter 1988 SUA 
Convention]. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2013 
Moving from Crisis Management to a Sustainable Solution 
55 
for flag states, port and coastal states,59 ship owners, ship operators, 
ship masters,60 and PMSCs, on the use of privately contracted armed 
security personnel that are onboard ships in the high risk areas.61 The 
IMO also provided interim guidance for flag states on measures to 
prevent and mitigate Somalia-based piracy.62 
C.  North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Since 2008, NATO has protected vessels and assisted to enhance 
the general level of security in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of 
Africa.63 Pursuant to the request of U.N. Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon, NATO started to provide escorts to U.N. World Food 
Programme (WFP) vessels transiting through this region in late 
2008.64 NATO’s deterrence patrols have prevented pirate hijacking of 
vessels and hostage taking. Since March 2012, NATO has also taken 
the initiative to “erode the pirates’ logistics and support base by, 
among other things, disabling pirate vessels or skiffs, attaching 
tracking beacons to mother ships and allowing the use of force to 
disable or destroy suspected pirate or armed robber vessels.”65  
NATO’s activities are undertaken by its ongoing initiative 
Operation Ocean Shield. The initiative’s capacity building projects 
assist regional states in developing their own abilities to combat 
 
59. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Revised Interim Recommendations for Flag 
States Regarding the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security 
Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area, IMO 
MSC.1/Circ.1406/Rev. 2 (May 25, 2012) [hereinafter IMO MSC Cir. 
1406]; Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Revised Interim Recommendations for 
Port and Coastal States Regarding the Use of Privately Contracted 
Armed Security Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area, IMO 
MSC.1/Circ.1408/Rev.1 (May 25, 2012) [hereinafter IMO MSC Cir. 
1408].  
60. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, 
Ship Operators and Shipmasters on the Use of Privately Contracted 
Armed Security Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area, IMO 
MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.2 (May 25, 2012) [hereinafter IMO MSC Cir. 
1405]. 
61. Int’l Maritime Organization [IMO], Interim Guidance to Private 
Maritime Security Companies Providing Privately Contracted Armed 
Security Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area, IMO 
MSC.1/Circ.1443 (May 25, 2012) [hereinafter IMO MSC Cir. 1443]. 
62. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Interim Guidance for Flag States on 
Measures to Prevent and Mitigate Somalia-Based Piracy, IMO 
MSC.1/Circ.1444 (May 25, 2012). 
63. See Counter-Piracy Operations, NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/ 
natolive/topics_48815.htm [hereinafter NATO Counter-Piracy 
Operations] (last visited Mar. 23, 2014).  
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
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piracy.66 Several countries, including Italy, the U.S., Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Turkey, the U.K., Portugal, Greece, and Canada, 
provide ships on a rotating basis to carry out its counter-piracy 
operations.67 In its 2012 Annual Report, NATO’s Secretary-General 
warned: 
The progress made in 2012 needs to be consolidated in the 
medium to long term. A deterrence presence, however effective 
and necessary in the short term, cannot bring a lasting solution 
to the problem of piracy. The countries in the region, including 
Somalia, need to develop the capacity to fight piracy 
themselves. During 2012, NATO offered capacity-building 
support . . . includ[ing] the training of coast guards. NATO is 
also helping to fight the root problem of piracy onshore by 
continuing to support the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM), at the African Union’s request, in terms of sea- and 
airlift and also with the provision of subject-matter experts on 
the ground.68 
NATO has extended its operation until the end of 2014.69 
D.  European Union 
The EU conducts its EU Naval Force Somalia (EU NAVFOR) 
Operation Atalanta, launched on December 8, 2008, in accordance 
with several U.N. Security Council resolutions. Its aim is to help 
deter, prevent, and repress maritime piracy; protect WFP vessels of 
the African Union Mission on Somalia (AMISOM) and humanitarian 
aid shipping; protect vulnerable shipping; and monitor fishing 
activities off the coast of Somalia.70 This operation permanently liaises 
with the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and NATO as well as 
units from several countries, including China, India, Japan, and 
Russia.71 The operation usually has five to ten surface combat vessels 
and conducts counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, the 
 
66. See Operation Ocean Shield (Counter Piracy Operations), NATO 
SHIPPING CTR., http://www.shipping.nato.int/operations/OS/Pages/ 
default.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2014).  
67. See NATO Counter-Piracy Operations, supra note 63. 
68. Secretary-General’s Annual Report 2012, NATO (Jan. 31, 2013), 
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_94220.htm. 
69. Anti-Piracy Activity off the Horn of Africa, NATO WATCH (Apr. 1, 
2012), http://www.natowatch.org/node/659. 
70. European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia – Operation 
ATALANTA, MAR. SECURITY CTR. HORN OF AFR., 
http://www.mschoa.org/on-shore/about-us/eu-operation-atalanta (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2014).  
71. Id. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2013 
Moving from Crisis Management to a Sustainable Solution 
57 
Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Sea to protect the 45,000 ships 
undergoing annual transits through those waters.72 
As the President of the Council of the EU stated in February 
2012:  
Fighting piracy and its root causes is a priority of our action in 
the Horn of Africa. Operation Atalanta has made a significant 
contribution to this effort, in coordination with our 
international partners. Today’s important decision extends 
Atalanta’s mandate for two more years and allows it to take 
more robust action on the Somali coast. Despite pressure on 
defence budgets, EU member states thereby demonstrate their 
renewed commitment to this successful operation.73 
Operation Atalanta has an admirable record insofar as it has had 
a 100 percent success rate in safely escorting WFP vessels delivering 
food and aid to Somali people. Similarly, the operation has protected 
AMISOM shipments and other vulnerable shipping within the 
International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC).74 One of its 
special initiatives has been, in partnership with the shipping industry, 
to establish the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), 
whose objective is to improve coordination between international 
military forces in the region and commercial shipping. MSCHOA 
provides constant manned monitoring of vessels passing through the 
Gulf of Aden and supplies anti-piracy guidance to shipping companies 
and operators.75 
EU NAVFOR works in cooperation with military and merchant 
navy personnel from several countries.76 To cite two recent incidents 
of Operation Atalanta’s successful operations, on April 12, 2013, the 
EU NAVFOR ocean patrol vessel’s helicopter crew spotted a skiff 
being launched off the Somali coast. The crew photographed the 
pirates aboard and watched as the skiff headed out to sea. Seeing that 
it was under surveillance, the skiff eventually returned to shore. The 
commanding officer of the EU NAVFOR vessel stated afterward, 
“One of the greatest challenges we face in such a huge sea area is to 
 
72. Id. 
73. Press Release, Council of the European Union, Council Extends EU 
Counter-Piracy Operation Atalanta, 7216/12 (Mar. 23, 2012), available 
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-12-92_en.htm.  
74. European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia – Operation 
ATALANTA, supra note 70. 
75. Id.  
76. For the activities of Operation Atalanta forces, see Countering Piracy 
off the Coast of Somalia, EU NAVFOR, http://www.eunavfor.eu/ (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
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be in the right place at the right time to apprehend suspect pirates 
and their vessels. . . . We remain ever watchful of the threat.”77 
In another incident, on June 5, 2013, an EU counter-piracy 
warship closed in on pirates who had taken control of an Indian cargo 
vessel in the Gulf of Aden and forced them to abandon their attack.78 
Following the operation, the operation commander of EU NAVFOR 
said: “What is important is that fourteen Indian sailors are now safe 
and able to return to their families, after what must have been a 
terrifying ordeal. This latest attack once again shows that the threat 
from piracy is real. We must all remain vigilant.”79 
E.  The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia 
In 2013 the United States took the lead and chaired CGPCS, 
which was created on January 14, 2009.80 This was pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1851, which encouraged  
all States and regional organizations fighting piracy and armed 
robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia to establish an 
international cooperation mechanism to act as a common point 
of contact between and among states, regional and international 
organizations on all aspects of combating piracy . . . off 
Somalia’s coast.81  
As a voluntary international forum, CGPCS coordinates political, 
military, and NGO efforts toward this goal. It is open to any country 
or organization that contributes to counter-piracy efforts or is affected 
by piracy.82 Currently, more than eighty nations, organizations, and 
industry groups sharing this common interest work together within 
the CGPCS.83 It also supports law enforcement and the judiciary 
 
77. EU Naval Force Ensures There Is No Hiding Place for Suspect Pirates, 
EU NAVFOR (Apr. 16, 2013), http://eunavfor.eu/eu-naval-force-
ensures-there-is-no-hiding-place-for-suspect-pirates/.  
78. See Indian Sailors Safe After EU NAVFOR Warship HSwMS 
Carlskrona Forces Pirates to Abandon Attack on Cargo Vessel, EU 
NAVFOR (June 6, 2013), http://eunavfor.eu/indian-sailors-safe-after-
eu-navfor-warship-hswms-carlskrona-forces-pirates-to-abandon-attack-
on-cargo-vessel/. 
79. Id. 
80. See Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia: Quarterly 
Update - Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE (July 18, 2013), http://www. 
state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2013/212140.htm [hereinafter Contact Group Fact 
Sheet]. 
81. S.C. Res. 1851, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008). 
82. Contact Group Fact Sheet, supra note 80. 
83. Id. 
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system in their investigations of piracy networks and in prosecutions 
of pirates in the region.84 
At its first meeting, CGPCS established four working groups, 
subsequently adding a fifth.85 Working Group (WG) 1 focuses on 
operational naval coordination, information sharing, and capacity 
building.86 WG 2 addresses legal and judicial issues and provides 
guidance to CGPCS, states, and organizations on all legal aspects of 
counter-piracy.87 WG 3 works with the shipping industry and has 
been instrumental in developing the BMP measures, which include 
providing guidelines to owners, masters, and crews to protect 
themselves against hijacking. 88 WG 4 aims at raising public awareness 
of the dangers of piracy,89 and WG 5 coordinates international efforts 
to identify and disrupt the private criminal enterprises ashore, 
including the financial network of pirate leaders and their financiers.90  
At its twelfth meeting on April 10-11, 2013, in Copenhagen, 
Denmark, WG 2 focused on three areas:  
(1)  prosecution and in-depth review of current legal challenges 
and solutions, including with regard to human rights 
issues;  
(2)  implementation of the post trial-transfer system and 
prosecution, including the legal framework for prosecuting 
piracy organizers and the handling of child pirates; and  
(3)  use of privately contracted armed security personnel and 
Vessel Protection Detachments.91 
CGPCS meets in plenary sessions for one day three times per year at 
the U.N., while the working groups meet regularly to develop and 
implement counter-piracy policy and programs.92 At its Thirteenth  
84. See Mission, CGPCS, http://www.thecgpcs.org/about.do?action= 
mission (last visited Mar. 23, 2014) (identifying four priorities for 2013).  
85. Working Groups, CGPCS, http://www.thecgpcs.org/work.do?action= 
work (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
86. Contact Group Fact Sheet, supra note 80. 
87. Id.; Working Group 2, CGPCS, http://www.thecgpcs.org/work.do? 
action=workSub2 (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
88. Working Group 3, CGPCS, http://www.thecgpcs.org/work.do?action= 
workSub3 (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
89. Contact Group Fact Sheet, supra note 80. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. International Response: Contact Group, U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/piracy/contactgroup/index.htm (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
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Plenary Session, on December 11, 2012, the CGPCS “reiterated the 
importance of an early declaration of an Exclusive Economic Zone off 
the Coast of Somalia, in accordance with the 1982 UN Convention of 
the Law of the Sea, which will promote the effective governance of 
waters off the Coast of Somalia.”93 It noted that the Trust Fund, 
which was established in January 2010 and is one of its initiatives 
that has supported piracy trials in several countries in the region,94 
stood at U.S.$16.5 million, while $12.12 million had been disbursed.95 
CGPCS called on the international community to provide strong 
support and assistance, including financial contributions to the Trust 
Fund and regional countries to prosecute and imprison pirates.96 
At its Fourteenth Plenary Session, CGPCS decided to focus on 
four specific areas during 2013, in addition to the work of the five 
working groups: (1) communication with the international 
community; (2) better integration with related programs and actors, 
including the Federal Government of Somalia; (3) strengthened legal 
efforts to disrupt networks ashore and their illicit financial flows; and 
(4) proactive discussion of policy and legal issues associated with the 
use of armed security on commercial ships.97 
Noting that more than 1,200 pirates are currently facing 
prosecution or have been prosecuted worldwide in more than twenty 
countries, CGPCS recognized the valuable contribution of prosecuting 
states in the region such as Kenya, Seychelles, and Mauritius.98 
 
93. Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, 13th Plenary Sess., 
Communique, ¶ 7 (Dec. 11, 2012) [hereinafter Thirteenth Plenary 
Session], available at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/othr/misc/ 
202270.htm. 
94. See Press Conference on Work of Contact Group on Piracy off Somali 
Coast, U.N. (Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.un.org/news/briefings/docs/ 
2010/100128_Somalia.doc.htm. The Trust Fund was established to help 
countries in the region fight piracy and its main objective is to “build 
capacity in their criminal-justice systems so they could prosecute” 
suspected pirates. Id. Subsequently, in April 2010, the Board of the 
Trust Fund decided to undertake five projects focused primarily on 
efforts to prosecute suspected pirates. Four of these projects were 
designed to help strengthen institutions in Seychelles and the 
autonomous Somali regions of Puntland and Somaliland, and the fifth 
project was aimed at helping local media “disseminate anti-Piracy 
messages within Somalia.” UN Trust Fund Backs Projects in Fight 
Against Piracy off Somali Coast, UN NEWS CTR. (Apr. 23, 2010), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnewsAr.asp?nid=34472. 
95. Thirteenth Plenary Session, supra note 93, ¶ 47. 
96. Id. 
97. Fourteenth Plenary Session of the Contact Group on Piracy off the 
Coast of Somalia, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (May 1, 2013), 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/othr/misc/208936.htm. 
98. Id. 
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Welcoming the work of UNODC, while specially noting its progress in 
its Piracy Prisoner Transfer Program and the continued 
implementation of the Post Trial-Transfer system, CGPCS reasserted:  
the need for all States to implement the relevant provisions of 
international law into their national systems, including to 
ensure that conspiracy to commit piracy is punishable under 
national law and that national law, procedures, and practices 
are geared to contribute to the disruption of piracy networks 
ashore, including through extradition and mutual legal 
assistance.99  
CGPCS also welcomed the Special Meeting of Piracy Prosecutors 
and Investigators hosted by INTERPOL and the WG 2 and WG 5 
chairs. CGPCS called upon the two chairs to continue facilitating 
increased information exchange and cooperation aimed at 
strengthening investigations “into common high-value targets and 
urged the practitioners to continue and enhance their cooperation.”100 
As this brief review shows, CGPCS acts proactively and 
effectively, notwithstanding its being an informal and ad hoc forum. 
As it has no budget and no secretariat, it costs little to function. The 
strength of CGPCS lies in its flexibility and its coordinating role. It 
supports governments, international organizations, and the shipping 
industry in their fight against piracy and has successfully served as an 
information sharing and cooperation mechanism.  
F.  Combined Task Force 151 
CTF-151 is one of three task forces operated by the CMF, a 
twenty-nine nation naval partnership voluntarily joined under U.S. 
leadership, with its mission “to disrupt piracy and armed robbery at 
sea and to engage with regional and other partners to build capacity 
and improve relevant capabilities in order to protect global maritime 
commerce and secure freedom of navigation.”101 Established in 
January 2009 under the authority of several U.N. Security Council 
Resolutions and in cooperation with non-member forces, CTF-151’s 
command is rotated between participating nations on a four- to 
six-month basis; its force flow constantly changes as vessels, aircrafts, 
and personnel from several countries are assigned to the task force. 
Along with NATO, the EU NAVFOR, and independently deployed 
naval ships, CTF-151 patrols the IRTC in the Gulf of Aden.102 
 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. CTF-151: Counter-Piracy, supra note 22. 
102. Id. Combined Maritime Forces “exists to promote security, stability and 
prosperity across approximately 2.5 million square miles of international 
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CTF-151 also undertakes “regional and key leader engagement, 
strategic communication and proactive public affairs,” and supports 
BMP. 103  
G.  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
The UNODC's Counter Piracy Programme (CPP), which was 
launched in 2009 and confined to helping Kenya, has now extended its 
operations to include Seychelles, Mauritius, Tanzania, Maldives, and 
Somalia.104 CPP supports efforts to detain and prosecute piracy 
suspects in compliance with international standards of rule of law and 
respect for human rights.105 The focus of the program is to ensure that 
the piracy trials are fair and efficient and that detention facilities are 
humane and secure for suspected and convicted pirates in Somalia as 
well as in other regional centers. The program assists these countries 
with capacity building programs for the judiciary system, prosecutors, 
and police, providing the countries with law books, specialist coast 
guard equipment, and office equipment.106  
CPP’s goal is to assist Somalia in upgrading its prisons and courts 
so Somali pirates convicted in other countries can serve their 
sentences in Somalia. The program has also undertaken construction 
and renovation of prisons in Somaliland and Puntland.107 CPP 
supports the criminal justice professionals of several states who are 
working on Somali piracy cases. To illustrate, Kenya has tried 
147 suspects in 18 trials, while Seychelles has tried 118 suspects in 
14 cases; the program’s support ensured the transfer of convicted 
pirates from Seychelles to Somaliland.108  
 
waters, which encompass some of the world’s most important shipping 
lanes.” About CMF, COMBINED MAR. FORCES, http://combined 
maritimeforces.com/about (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
103. CTF-151: Counter-Piracy, supra note 22; see also Combined Maritime 
Forces Improve Piracy Awareness, COMBINED MAR. FORCES (Nov. 29, 
2012), http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2012/11/29/combined-
maritime-forces-improve-piracy-awareness/ (collaborating with Yemen 
to collect data to learn pirates’ habits and deter their activities); CCTF 
151 Reinforces Support in Seychelles, COMBINED MAR. FORCES (Dec. 4, 
2012), http://combinedmaritimeforces.com/2012/12/04/cctf-151-
reinforces-support-in-seychelles/ (citing “the adoption of best 
management practices by merchant vessels” as one reason for reduced 
piracy attacks). 
104. See UNODC and Piracy, UNODC (Mar. 2013), http://www.unodc.org/ 
unodc/en/piracy/index.html?ref=menuside. 
105. Id.  
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
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With UNODC’s support, the Somalia Law Reform Group, 
comprising experts from all three Somali regions, has been working on 
counter-piracy legislation to be introduced across Somalia. It has 
already produced the draft laws on the following: criminalizing piracy; 
providing for and regulating prison transfers; regulating the 
management and operation of prisons; and creating prison regulations, 
all of which complement the draft prison laws.109 
With over 1,200 suspected or convicted pirates detained in 
twenty-one countries around the world,110 UNODC also provides 
extensive support to law enforcement and legal systems as they face 
the challenge of investigating and prosecuting piracy. The EU and 
UNODC work jointly with a prosecuting state—recently in January 
2013, twelve suspected pirates were detained by EU NAVFOR and 
transferred to Mauritius for trial. Similar assistance was given earlier 
to Kenya and to Seychelles.111 In just four years since its creation, 
CPP has impressive accomplishments to report: four courtrooms 
constructed or under construction; support to six piracy prosecuting 
centers; nine prisons constructed, refurbished, or underway; forty-six 
hostages helped to return home; 300 Somali pirates prosecuted or 
awaiting trial in Seychelles, Kenya, or Mauritius; 350 judicial and law 
enforcement officials who have participated in UNODC-organized 
learning exchanges; 400 Somali prison staff trained; 500 days of 
interpretation provided; 1,400 international standard prison spaces 
provided; and 600 prisoners provided with welfare support.112  
As the prosecution of pirates presents an immense legal and 
logistical challenge, UNODC has indeed played an important role in 
ensuring that the rule of law undergirds the process. 
IV.  The United States’ Response to Piracy 
In 2007, in response to the rise of piracy off the coast of Somalia, 
President George W. Bush signed the U.S. policy on piracy and 
armed robbery at sea.113 Subsequently, in December 2008, the U.S. 
National Security Council released an action plan, implementing a 
 
109. SG’s Oct. 2012 Report, supra note 28, ¶ 54. 
110. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, COUNTER-PIRACY PROGRAMME: 
SUPPORT TO THE TRIAL AND RELATED TREATMENT OF PIRACY SUSPECTS, 
ISSUE 11, at 1 (2013), available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/ 
easternafrica//piracy/UNODC_Brochure_Issue_11_wv.pdf.  
111. Id. at 6. 
112. Id. at 2. 
113. See Press Release, Memorandum from the President on Maritime 
Security (Piracy) Policy, GEORGE W. BUSH-WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES 
(June 14, 2007), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ 
releases/2007/06/20070614-3.html. 
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policy, among others, which seeks to involve all nations, international 
organizations, and industry that are interested in taking steps to 
repress piracy off the Horn of Africa.114 The plan focuses on 
operational measures for prevention, disruption, and punishment of 
acts of Somali pirate organizations.115 
Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress power to 
“define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas 
and Offences against the Law of Nations.”116 Enacted in 1891, the 
statute defining piracy reads: “Whoever, on the high seas, commits 
the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards 
brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for 
life.”117 In a 2010 case, United States v. Said, a federal district court 
construed this statute and dismissed the piracy count against 
defendant Said and his co-defendants, all of whom were passengers 
aboard a skiff from which shots were fired on the USS Ashland in the 
Gulf of Aden in April 2010.118 The court concluded that “the 
discernible definition of piracy as ‘robbery or forcible depredations 
committed on the high seas’ under § 1651 has remained consistent 
and has reached a level of concrete consensus in United States law.”119 
The court then dismissed the count because as the defendants had not 
boarded, taken control, or otherwise robbed the Ashland, the 
defendants had not committed the offense of piracy as defined by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in 1820 in United States v. Smith.120  
In United States v. Hasan,121 which was decided soon after Said, 
another federal district court, unlike the Said court, distinguished 
“municipal piracy,” that is, piracy in violation of U.S. law, which 
requires a jurisdictional nexus with the U.S., from “general piracy,” 
which can be prosecuted by any nation without a jurisdictional 
nexus.122 In doing so, the court interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (the 
piracy statute) as a demonstration of congressional intent “to 
 
114. U.S. NAT’L SECURITY COUNCIL, COUNTERING PIRACY OFF THE HORN OF 
AFRICA: PARTNERSHIP & ACTION PLAN 3 (2008), available at 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Countering_Piracy_Off_The_
Horn_of_Africa_-_Partnership__Action_Plan.pdf. 
115. Id. at 3–4.  
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
117. 18 U.S.C. § 1651. 
118. United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554, 556–57 (E.D. Va. 2010), 
vacated, 680 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2012). 
119. Id. at 560.  
120. Id. at 562; see United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 162 (1820) (holding 
“that piracy, by the law of nations, is robbery upon the sea”). 
121. United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
122. Id. at 606. 
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incorporate . . . any subsequent developments in the definition of 
general piracy under the law of nations.”123 Thus, the Hasan court 
determined that the defendants’ violent conduct in attacking the U.S. 
naval frigate on the high seas, even if they did not seize or rob the 
ship, constituted piracy under the law of nations.124 The Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the holding of Hasan in 2012 in 
United States v. Dire,125 agreeing with “the conception of the law 
outlined by the court below.”126 The Dire court held, “[b]ecause the 
district court correctly applied the UNCLOS definition of piracy as 
customary international law, we reject the defendants’ challenge” to 
their conviction of piracy.127 
Subsequently, on June 11, 2013, the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court of Appeals in United States v. Ali128 interpreted Article 101(c) 
of UNCLOS to suggest that “a facilitative act need not occur on the 
high seas so long as its predicate offense has,”129 and hence there is 
“no indication international law limits the liability of aiders and 
abettors to their conduct on the high seas.”130 Thus, an aider and 
abettor need not have acted on the high seas for such an act to be 
considered piracy.  
The defendant in Ali, a Somali national who had helped negotiate 
the ransom of a merchant vessel and its crew after their capture in 
the Gulf of Aden, was charged with “aiding and abetting” piracy.131 
He argued that as his acts were committed on land and in territorial 
waters and not upon the high seas, he was not a pirate.132 Based upon 
his defense, the district court restricted the charge of “aiding and 
abetting” piracy to conduct on the high seas, and hence dismissed the 
piracy charge.133 As noted above, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district 
court, determining that the charge could stand, as the facilitative act 
 
123. Id. at 623. 
124. Id. at 640–41. 
125. United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 469 (4th Cir. 2012), aff’g 747 F. 
Supp. 2d 599 (2010) (agreeing with the district court’s analysis of the 
piracy definition).  
126. Id. at 467. 
127. Id. at 469.  
128. United States v. Ali (Ali I), 718 F.3d 929 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
129. Id. at 937. 
130. Id. at 938. 
131. United States v. Ali (Ali II), 870 F. Supp. 2d 10, 16, 18 (D.C. Cir. 
2012). 
132. Ali I, 718 F.3d at 932. 
133. United States v. Ali (Ali III), 885 F. Supp. 2d 17, 32 (D.D.C. 2012).  
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of aiding and abetting does not need to occur on the high seas.134 
However, the D.C. Circuit held that UNCLOS’ plain language did not 
include conspiracy to commit piracy.135 
V.  The Regulation of Private Maritime Security 
Companies 
The use of PMSCs by ship owners and operators has been one of 
the most important factors leading to the decline in successful pirate 
attacks off the Horn of Africa,136 as evidenced by the correlation 
between the rise of PMSC employment and the fall of pirate attacks 
that occurred in the second half of 2011.137 States initially rejected the 
use of PMSCs, but the practice has gained increased acceptance due 
to the effectiveness of the firms in deterring attacks.138 Today, PMSCs 
are regulated to various degrees at the national and international 
levels, but there are still reports that PMSCs are not held accountable 
 
134. Ali I, 718 F.3d at 941. 
135. Id. at 942 (citing Ved P. Nanda, Maritime Piracy: How Can 
International Law and Policy Address This Growing Global Menace?, 39 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 177, 181 (2011)) (holding that unlike aiding 
and abetting, conspiracy is not part of the UNCLOS definition of 
piracy).  
136. See What Happened to Somalia’s Pirates, THE ECONOMIST (May 19, 
2013), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/05/ 
economist-explains-11 (noting that more than 60 percent of vessels carry 
armed guards, which has led to a decline in pirate attacks); see also 
David Smith & Clar Ni Chonghaile, Somali Pirates Hijacking Fewer 
Merchant Ships, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 23, 2012), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/23/somali-piracy-declines.  
137. JAMES BROWN, LOWY INST. FOR INT’L POL’Y, PIRATES AND PRIVATEERS: 
MANAGING THE INDIAN OCEAN’S PRIVATE SECURITY BOOM 7 (2012), 
available at http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/brown_pirates_and_ 
privateers_web.pdf (noting that the vast majority of PMSCs were 
created in 2011); Jonathan Bellish, The Economic Cost of Piracy 2012, 
at 7 (2013) (working paper) (on file with Oceans Beyond Piracy & One 
Earth Future Found.) (providing a chart that shows the decline in 
pirate attacks beginning in late 2011 and continuing through 2012). 
138. See, e.g., Adjoa Anyimadu, Somalia: Moving Beyond Piracy?, MAR. 
SECURITY REVIEW (May 9, 2013), http://www.marsecreview.com/2013/ 
05/somalia-moving-beyond-piracy/ (“An increasing acceptance of the 
presence of private armed guards aboard vessels has been one of the 
most controversial counter-piracy methods introduced in the Indian 
Ocean. But it seems to have been an effective deterrent and, despite 
concerns about the risk to innocent fishermen and other seafarers who 
may be mistaken for pirates, some governments, including the US and 
UK administrations, have been reassured by the oft-repeated phrase 
that no ship with private armed guards on board has been successfully 
hijacked.”). 
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for their actions.139 Part of moving past the crisis management stage 
and towards a sustainable solution to piracy off the coast of Somalia 
is continued suppression at sea while efforts on shore progress. PMSCs 
will surely be a part of that suppression. It is therefore important to 
provide accountability in a way that allows PMSCs and their clients 
to accomplish their goals, while simultaneously respecting human 
rights and the rule of law. 
This section proceeds from the premise that there should be two 
primary goals for regulating the private maritime security industry: 
(1) ensuring the effective provision of maritime security for the client; 
and (2) protecting the lives of innocent civilians—local fishermen and 
tradesmen—who might be mistaken for pirates or otherwise caught in 
the crossfire. The first goal is achieved by ensuring that the roles of 
the PMSC and client are properly defined, that maritime security 
providers are properly insured, vetted, and trained, and that PMSCs 
have adequate procedures in place related to the carriage of weapons 
and the use of force. The second goal is best achieved by ensuring 
that private security providers follow the procedures in place, that the 
misuse of force is properly criminalized, and that providers are held 
accountable if and when force is misused. 
After reviewing the national, international, and non-governmental 
regulatory regimes currently applicable to the private maritime 
security industry, this section concludes that ongoing efforts are 
relatively effective at furthering the first goal, and any shortcomings 
related to the second are not the result of inadequate regulation on 
the books, but a lack of incident reporting and accountability at sea. 
A.  Ongoing Regulatory Efforts in the Private Maritime Security 
Industry 
The private maritime security industry is currently regulated at 
the national, international, and nongovernmental levels. While this 
system of regulations has moved the industry forward in terms of its 
ability to provide effective security services to clients in a transparent 
manner, it has done much less to actively deter operations that might 
result in the grave injury or death of innocent civilians. 
1.  National regulation 
At one time a rarity, Private Contracted Armed Security 
Personnel (PCASP) teams have been gaining popularity among 
shipping companies. As demand for these specialized contractors 
increased, flag states began devising legislation to regulate their 
operation. A notable increase in the creation of state regulatory 
regimes occurred between 2008 and 2010, in step with the increase of 
pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia and, presumably, the demand 
 
139. See infra notes 173–75 & accompanying text. 
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for security teams. The severity of regulation varies greatly by state, 
with some states even banning the use of PCASP teams outright.140 
Others, such as Italy, restrict their use to those instances when the 
state cannot provide protection on its own.141 However, most states 
with PCASP laws permit the operation of PCASP teams subject to 
regulation.142 
Though the regulations are diverse, a few common threads run 
through the majority of the rules. Most flag states require that the 
teams register themselves and their weapons with the flag state.143 
Many states also require teams to be from companies that have been 
specially certified by the state.144 Regulations that require security 
incident reporting are also common, and some states take an 
additional step of requiring adherence to agreed-upon rules governing 
the use of force.145  
While these are positive steps, the degree to which state 
regulations shape the actual behavior of PCASP teams is unclear. 
Because of the international nature of the modern shipping industry, 
PMSCs and their clients are able to “shop around” to find a 
jurisdiction with regulations that offer them the best chance of 
financial success. This generally means that the nations with the least 
stringent regulatory regimes remain attractive to increasing numbers 
of private security teams, effectively offering a haven for those groups 
who would prefer to avoid more taxing rules. Since it is not possible 
to restrict state selection by PCASP companies, we risk a “race to the 
bottom,” in which those states that wish to attract the business of 
 
140. Oceans Beyond Piracy, PCASP Regulation and Oversight (discussion 
paper) (on file with the authors) [hereinafter OBP Discussion Paper]. 
The following countries have banned PCASP teams: China, France, 
Japan, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Portugal. See also Comparison 
of Flag State Laws on Armed Guards and Arms on Board, INT’L 
CHAMBER OF SHIPPING (2013), http://www.ics-shipping.org/docs/ 
default-source/Piracy-Docs/flag-state-rules-and-requirements-on-arms-
and-private-armed-guards-on-board-vessels-11-13.pdf [hereinafter ICS 
Comparison].  
141. OBP Discussion Paper, supra note 140; see also ICS Comparison, supra 
note 140. 
142. OBP Discussion Paper, supra note 140. The following states permit 
PCASP teams to operate subject to regulation: Antigua/Barbuda, the 
Bahamas, Bermuda, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, the Isle of Man, Italy, Jamaica, 
Liberia, Lithuania, Malta, Marshall Islands, Norway, Panama, Poland, 
Singapore, Spain, the U.K., and the U.S. Id.; see also ICS Comparison, 
supra note 140. 
143. ICS Comparison, supra note 140 (noting Spain and Italy as examples). 
144. Id. (citing Hong Kong and Cyprus as examples). 
145. Id. (indicating Germany and Belgium as examples). 
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these organizations develop increasingly lax regulations—or choose 
not to stringently enforce their regulations—in order to compete. 
2.  International regulation 
Intuitively, international regulation seems like a reasonable 
solution to this problem. PMSCs would be forced to comply at least 
with the international standard, even if the state in which they 
operated had less stringent regulations. There have been attempts to 
formulate such a regime. The IMO has released a series of circulars 
that make recommendations concerning the use of PCASP teams that 
are directed at different actors in the shipping and security 
community.146 IMO MSC circular 1405 is directed at ship owners, 
operators, and masters, and advises on how PCASP teams should be 
trained and selected. It also recommends that rules for the use of force 
be put in place and that record-keeping occur.147 IMO MSC circular 
1406 offers advice to flag states on how to set up a PCASP regulatory 
regime. IMO MSC circular 1408 gives recommendations to coastal 
states that may find themselves compelled to write laws governing 
PCASP teams that transit their waters or embark or disembark in 
their ports.148 IMO MSC circular 1443 advises PCASP companies 
themselves and recommends that they adopt many of the proposals 
outlined in IMO MSC circular 1405.149 Unfortunately, the 
IMO-outlined standards are offered as voluntary recommendations 
and do not have binding force on any PCASP teams.  
This leaves the international community in an uncomfortable 
position. Though states have the power to enforce their regulations, 
companies can avoid them by moving to jurisdictions with more 
favorable rules. Conversely, while international regulations are 
inescapable, to date they are purely voluntary and therefore difficult 
or impossible to enforce. This has left the industry and other 
interested stakeholders with the task of developing a diverse and 
fragmented system of nongovernmental regulation to help fill the 
gaps. 
3.  Nongovernmental regulation 
In addition to national and international regulation, there have 
been several attempts to regulate PMSCs outside of the governmental 
sphere. These nongovernmental regulations have come in the form of 
industry associations, model contracts, and standards-making 
 
146. See IMO MSC Cir. 1405, supra note 60; IMO MSC Cir. 1406, supra 
note 59; IMO MSC Cir. 1443, supra note 61. 
147. IMO MSC Cir. 1405, supra note 60, Annex § 4. 
148. IMO MSC Cir. 1406, supra note 59, Annex ¶ 5; IMO MSC Cir. 1408, 
supra note 59, Annex ¶ 6. 
149. IMO MSC Cir. 1443, supra note 61, Annex ¶ 1.6. 
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processes, and each effort has been met with varying degrees of 
success. 
One avenue for PMSC regulation is through the development of 
industry associations. The most prominent example of these 
associations is the Security Association for the Maritime Industry 
(SAMI).150 As of March 2014, SAMI was comprised of 185 members151 
and has a multi-tiered certification scheme consisting of internal due 
diligence, an audit, and an operational site visit.152 However, an 
inherent flaw in regulating an industry through industry associations 
is that the association relies on dues paid by PMSCs to continue 
operations. Thus, if the standards emanating from these associations 
are overly stringent, the association risks losing members as well as 
the dues that allow the association to operate. This makes industry 
associations less than ideal sources of regulation. 
Another regulatory tool stemming from the private sector is 
GUARDCON, a model contract developed by the Baltic and 
International Maritime Council (BIMCO) for use by shipping 
companies when negotiating terms of employment with PMSCs.153 
There are a number of GUARDCON provisions that could potentially 
regulate the behavior of PMSCs, including the requirements that 
teams be comprised of four members154 and use “all reasonable skill 
and care” in performing security services,155 as well as requirements 
dealing with the minimum resources that must be available to 
PMSCs.156 Nonetheless, the primary purpose of GUARDCON is to 
clarify the relationship between PMSCs and ship owners, not to 
 
150. Certified PMSCS Members, SAMI, http://www.seasecurity.org/ 
directory_categories/certified-pmscs/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). See 
also IAMSP: INT’L ASS’N OF MAR. SECURITY PROFESSIONALS, 
http://iamsponline.org/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2014) (noting that its 
mission is to provide an association for private security professionals). 
151. Certified PMSCS Members, supra note 150. 
152. SAMI Certification for PMSCs, SAMI, http://www.seasecurity.org/ 
sami-certification-for-pmscs/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2014). 
153. BIMCO, GUARDCON CONTRACT FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF SECURITY 
GUARDS ON VESSELS (last updated Apr. 1, 2013), available at 
https://www.bimco.org/Chartering/Documents/Security/GUARDCON.
aspx. 
154. Id. Annex F § 2(3). 
155. Id. § 3(6). 
156. See, e.g., id. § 3(6)(a)(viii) (requiring PMSCs to provide and maintain 
adequate resources); id. § 3(6)(a)(ix) (requiring a PMSC to have an 
onshore operational point of contact available 24 hours a day to provide 
support, intelligence, and backup); id. § 3(6)(b)(i)(1)–(9) (requiring that 
PMSC personnel are adequately trained, experienced, insured, and 
credentialed). 
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regulate PMSCs.157 For example, clients are free to modify the 
contract as they see fit, and BIMCO specifically states that 
developing rules for the use of force are “outside [its] remit.”158 
Accordingly, like industry associations, model contracts such as 
GUARDCON are not likely to provide the sort of comprehensive 
regulation that leads to increased accountability. 
The third avenue that has been pursued to regulate PMSCs is 
open standards with independent auditing. On this particular front, 
three processes are under development: (1) the ASIS/ANSI PSC 
Standards;159 (2) the International Code of Conduct for Private 
Security Providers (ICoC);160 and (3) the ISO PAS 28007 standard.161 
Although each standard is in different stages of development, none 
are fully operational. Nonetheless, these standards touch on issues of 
company certification, personnel vetting, team and weapon check-in, 
use of force, and incident reporting.162 While the ISO PAS 28007 and 
the PSC Standards will use external and independent auditing to 
measure compliance,163 the ICoC is developing a tripartite governance 
structure that will meet annually in Geneva to manage the 
implementation of the standard.164 
 
157. See BIMCO, EXPLANATORY NOTES TO GUARDCON STANDARD 
CONTRACT FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF SECURITY GUARDS ON VESSELS 1, 
available at  https://www.bimco.org/Chartering/Documents/Security/ 
~/media/Chartering/Document_Samples/Sundry_Other_Forms/Expla
natory_Notes_GUARDCON.ashx (“The use of GUARDCON is not in 
any way intended to be a substitute for the proper exercise of due 
diligence by ship owners as part of the pre-contractual process when 
selecting a security company to provide unarmed or armed guards for a 
ship.”). 
158. Id. at 2. 
159. Michael J. Stack, ASIS Completes Work on PSC Series of ANSI 
Standards, ASIS INT’L (Apr. 11, 2013), https://www.asisonline.org/ 
News/Press-Room/Press-Releases/2013/Pages/East.aspx. 
160. INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE 
PROVIDERS (2010) [hereinafter ICoC], available at 
http://www.icocpsp.org/uploads/INTERNATIONAL_CODE_OF_CO
NDUCT_Final_without_Company_Names.pdf. 
161. See Liz McMahon, Pilot Launched for PMSC Benchmark, 25 CURRENT 
AWARENESS BULL. (Int’l Mar. Org., London, U.K.), Mar. 2013, at 14, 
available at http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/sector/regulation/article 
418223.ece. 
162. OBP Discussion Paper, supra note 140. 
163. See McMahon, supra note 161, at 14; Stack, supra note 159 (mentioning 
the standard for “Conformity Assessment and Auditing Management 
Systems for Quality of Private Security Company Operations”). 
164. See ICoC, supra note 160, ¶ 7(b) (establishing the tripartite governance 
structure based on certification of compliance with the Code, auditing 
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The final set of privately-developed international standards is the 
100 Series Rules on the Use of Force, created by British maritime 
attorney David Hammond and endorsed by many members of the 
shipping and private security industries.165 Unlike the ICoC, ASIS 
PSC Standards, and ISO PAS 28007, the 100 Series Rules have no 
external enforcement mechanism. While these rules are not legally 
binding and provide no legal immunity,166 they do purport to set out 
“how and under which circumstances force may be used in self-defence 
in the context of maritime piracy, armed robbery or hijacking.”167 
These rules describe a situation where the vessel master retains 
nominal control over security team members, but any member is free 
to use force if he or she personally feels a threat of death or imminent 
bodily harm.168 In other words, the rules describe a use of force regime 
that would exist even in the absence of all regulatory oversight. 
This sort of nongovernmental regulation, however, has done more 
to institutionalize good behavior than shape it. Becoming a member 
of an industry association, utilizing a model contract, or signing on to 
open standards with independent auditing does indeed send a signal 
to potential clients that PMSCs meet certain criteria. These schemes 
will not, however, effectively shape the behavior of would-be 
irresponsible PMSCs until clients make employment conditional on 
adherence to one or more of these standards. For this reason, 
regulation to date has done a better job of furthering the goal of 
providing effective security services to clients who value such services 
rather than protecting innocent life from less responsible PMSCs. 
B.  Criminal Jurisdiction at Sea and the Case of Mistaken Identity 
The second goal of private maritime security regulation described 
above—the protection of innocent life—is a central objective of 
criminal law in general.169 This proposition appears to be almost 
self-evident, as homicide has been criminalized since at least 
 
and monitoring of work in the field, and a mechanism for addressing 
alleged violations). 
165. See 100SERIESRULES, https://100seriesrules.com (last visited Mar. 23, 
2014). 
166. THE 100 SERIES RULES: AN INTERNATIONAL MODEL SET OF MARITIME 
RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE (RUF) ¶ 11, available at 
https://100seriesrules.com/uploads/20130503-100_Series_Rules_for_ 
the_Use_of_Force.pdf. 
167. Id. ¶ 1. 
168. See id. ¶ 17.3. 
169. See R v. Howe, [1987] A.C. 417 (H.L.) 430 (appeal taken from Eng.) 
(“The overriding objects of the criminal law must be to protect innocent 
lives and to set a standard of conduct which ordinary men and women 
are expected to observe if they are to avoid criminal responsibility.”). 
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2050 B.C.170 Yet there is evidence that innocent life is being lost at 
sea, sometimes with impunity. The most prominent example is the 
case of mistaken identity, in which two Italian marines aboard the 
MV Enrica Lexie allegedly shot and killed two Indian fishermen and 
are now currently on trial in India.171 Additionally, soldiers have killed 
at least five Yemeni fishermen since 2009, mistaking them for 
pirates.172  
Although these reported incidents were allegedly perpetrated by 
soldiers as opposed to private armed guards, there have been 
anecdotal reports that private security companies have paid the 
families of Somali victims to avoid being hauled into court.173 
Combine that anecdotal evidence with the general problem of 
underreporting incidents of piracy174 and the many videos online 
depicting what appears to be less than responsible use of force,175 and 
it is not hard to imagine that at least some collateral damage goes 
unreported. 
Unlike the first goal of providing effective security services, 
protecting innocent life does not require much if any new regulation. 
Rather, because the required jurisdictional and substantive criminal 
provisions are largely in place, ensuring the safety of innocent 
 
170. See THE CODE OF UR-NAMMU art. 1, available at 
http://www.hammurapi.ch/ressources/Codex_Ur_Nammu_en.pdf?PH
PSESSID=89d16c4077d3057923163aed99c7305e (“If a man commits a 
murder, that man must be killed.”). The Code is believed to have been 
written around 2050 BC. See Douglas B. Ammar, Forgiveness and the 
Law—A Redemptive Opportunity, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1583, 1589 
n.13 (2000). 
171. India, Italy in Talks to Speed Up Marines Trial, NEWS TRACK INDIA 
(Jul. 15, 2013), http://www.newstrackindia.com/newsdetails/2013/ 
07/15/361--India-Italy-in-talks-to-speed-up-marines-trial-.html. 
172. Alan Katz, Fighting Piracy Goes Awry with Killings of Fishermen, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
09-16/fighting-piracy-goes-awry-with-killings-of-fishermen.html. 
173. Michael Frodl, C-LEVEL Maritime Risks Weekly Express News Update 
(TM), Vol. IV, No. 349 (Aug. 4, 2013) (on file with the author).  
174. See Michelle Wiese Bockmann, Ships with Armed Guards Seen Not 
Reporting Somali Pirate Strikes, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 23, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-23/ships-with-armed-guards-
seen-not-reporting-somali-pirate-strikes.html (quoting IMB Director 
Pottengal Mukundan as saying, “[v]essels with private armed security 
are not reporting the attempted attacks that other vessels were 
reporting before”). 
175. See, e.g., PCASP Network, Maritime Security Guards Shoot Somali 
Pirates.mp4, YOUTUBE (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=EirA 1h3W76w; PCASP Network, Pirate Attack Against 
Russian Maritime Security Team, YOUTUBE (Apr. 26, 2012), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2rkiar1dlas. 
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fishermen and tradesmen who might be mistaken for pirates is best 
accomplished through adequate incident reporting and law 
enforcement. 
1.  Criminal jurisdiction at sea 
Traditionally, the flag state has exclusive criminal jurisdiction 
over individuals aboard its ships.176 The principle of exclusive flag 
state jurisdiction is related to the doctrine of mare liberum, more 
commonly known as “freedom of the seas.” The doctrine refers to the 
equal right of all states to make beneficial use of the world’s oceans 
beyond the territorial seas and was well articulated by Sir William 
Scott in Le Louis:  
In places where no local authority exists, where the subjects of 
all States meet upon a footing of entire equality and 
independence, no one state, or any of its subjects, has a right to 
assume or exercise authority over the subjects of another. . . . 
[N]o nation can exercise a right of visitation and search upon 
the common and unappropriated parts of the sea, save only on 
the belligerent claim.177 
This principle was codified and made subject to expressly defined 
exceptions in Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High 
Seas (“1958 High Seas Convention”).178  
UNCLOS provides an excellent starting point to discuss the 
modern state of criminal jurisdiction at sea, as it is binding on 
166 countries and considered authoritative even by states that have 
not ratified it.179 However, state practice suggests a willingness to 
assert criminal jurisdiction beyond the scope of UNCLOS. 
 
176. See R v. Lewis, (1857) 169 Eng. Rep. 968, 970 (holding that a crime 
committed by a U.S. citizen aboard a U.S.-flagged ship is ultra vires 
U.K. jurisdiction). 
177. Le Louis, (1817) 165 Eng. Rep. 1464, 1475–76. 
178. Convention on the High Seas art. 6, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 
13 U.S.T 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962), 
[hereinafter 1958 High Seas Convention] (stating that vessels are under 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state except in certain cases 
enumerated in the treaty). 
179. Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to 
the Convention and the Related Agreements as at 29 October 2013, UN, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ra
tifications.htm (last updated Sept. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Chronological 
Lists] (listing the 166 states who have ratified UNCLOS); see 
Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 
I.C.J. 13, ¶¶ 29–34 (June 3) (accepting certain provisions of UNCLOS 
as evidence of customary international law); see also IAN BROWNLIE, 
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 214 (5th ed. 1998) (citing 
the Continental Shelf opinion and explaining how certain treaty 
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As noted above, under UNCLOS, only the flag state or the 
national state of the alleged perpetrator may institute penal or 
disciplinary proceedings regarding any incident of navigation on the 
high seas, and only the flag state may detain a ship for the purposes 
of a criminal investigation.180 In the EEZ, those principles are limited, 
as the coastal state retains sovereign rights over natural resources and 
jurisdiction over artificial installations, scientific research, and the 
protection of the maritime environment.181 Under UNCLOS, even in 
the territorial waters of another state, the flag state’s criminal 
jurisdiction can only be undermined by the coastal state if the effects 
of the crime extend to the coastal state; the crime disturbs the peace 
of the coastal state or its territorial sea; the flag state requests the 
coastal state’s assistance; or the coastal state suspects drug 
trafficking.182  
Despite the primacy afforded to criminal jurisdiction on the high 
seas based on the flag state and the nationality of the perpetrator, 
states have successfully asserted criminal jurisdiction on the high seas 
through other jurisdictional theories. For example, in United States v. 
Neil, the court found jurisdiction under the passive personality 
principle for a sexual assault committed by a citizen of St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines against a U.S. national aboard a 
Panamanian-flagged ship.183 A similar rationale was employed by 
Canadian courts in extradition hearings concerning the murders of 
stowaways aboard the Maersk Dubai.184 Perhaps more creatively, in 
1995 the Cour de Cassation exercised jurisdiction over the murder of 
eight African stowaways by Ukrainian nationals on a 
Bahamian-flagged ship outside French territorial waters.185 The 
French court relied on the territorial principle, holding that because 
one stowaway escaped, and the crew was searching for him when the 
 
provisions are universally accepted and become part of customary 
international law); DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 111 (Elizabeth R. Wilcox ed., 2010) (“[T]he 
actions and statements of the Executive Branch over more than six 
decades reflect the consistent U.S. view that [the UNCLOS piracy] 
definition is both reflective of customary international law and 
universally accepted by states.”). 
180. UNCLOS, supra note 57, art. 97, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 435. 
181. Id. arts. 56, 60, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 418, 419–20. 
182. Id. art. 27, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 407–08. 
183. United States v. Neil, 312 F.3d 419, 423 (9th Cir. 2002). 
184. See Elissa Steglich, Hiding in the Hulls: Attacking the Practice of High 
Seas Murder of Stowaways Through Expanded Criminal Jurisdiction, 78 
TEX. L. REV. 1323, 1327−29 (2000). 
185. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., 
May 3, 1995, Bull. crim., No. 152 (Fr.). 
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ship entered French territorial waters, the crime was a continuing one 
that partially occurred inside France’s territory.186 Thus, through a 
non-traditional interpretation of the territorial principle of 
jurisdiction, the French courts provided yet another avenue to assert 
criminal jurisdiction over foreign-flagged merchant ships. 
In sum, treaty law and state practice suggest that states can 
successfully assert jurisdiction over violent crimes committed on the 
high seas through traditional applications of the territorial principle 
(applying the law of the flag state), non-traditional applications of the 
territorial principle (in the case of a continuing crime), the nationality 
principle, and the passive personality principle. These options provide 
states broad latitude to pursue acts of violence committed at sea. 
2.  Criminal law in a case of mistaken identity at sea 
Given the wide latitude of states to attach criminal jurisdiction to 
crimes committed on the high seas, initiating a prosecution for an 
alleged case of mistaken identity should be a relatively 
straightforward proposition—at least in theory. An alleged case of 
mistaken identity in the context of a private security guard and 
fishermen or tradesmen would simply be prosecuted by a court with 
jurisdiction as a homicide charge asserted by the victim or the 
victim’s estate and met with a claim of imperfect self-defense by the 
security team member.187 
To illustrate the availability of jurisdiction for mistaken identity 
crimes, open registries, sometimes known as “flags of convenience,” 
are considered attractive options because they lack strict 
regulations.188 Each of the top five open registry states by volume—
Panama, Marshall Islands, Liberia, Malta, and the Bahamas189—has 
all the necessary law in place to prosecute a case of mistaken identity. 
Each state explicitly asserts jurisdiction over its flagged vessels,190  
186. Id. 
187. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1390 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “imperfect 
self-defense” as “[t]he use of force by one who makes an honest but 
unreasonable mistake that force is necessary to repel an attack”). 
188. See Brian Baker, Flags of Convenience and the Gulf Oil Spill: Problems 
and Proposed Solutions, 34 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 687, 695 (2012) (noting, for 
example, the ease of maritime vessel registration in these states); see 
also H. Edwin Anderson, III, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of 
Convenience: Economics, Politics, and Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 
139, 157–58 (1996). 
189. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., REVIEW OF MARITIME TRANSPORT, 
at 48, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/RMT/2012, U.N. Sales No. E.12.II.D.17 
(2012). 
190. See El Código Penal de Panamá [The Penal Code of Panama][CPP] tit. 
1, ch. 2, art. 18; The Maritime Act 1990 [TMA] § 711 (Marsh. Is.); 
Liber. Code of Laws [LCL] tit. 21, ch. 2, § 84; Malta Criminal Code 
[MCC] art. 5(1)(b); Bah. Penal Code [BPC], tit. 1, § 10. 
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criminalizes homicide in its criminal code,191 and each state save one 
explicitly outlines its rules on self-defense in its criminal code.192 If 
these countries, often criticized for their lack of regulatory power over 
their vessels, have sufficient law in place to handle a case of mistaken 
identity, it seems reasonable to assume that other states with tougher 
regulatory requirements would be similarly situated.  
Thus despite the fact that many have suggested that PMSCs 
exist in a legal “grey area” or “vacuum,”193 this is not the case as it 
relates to prosecuting cases of mistaken identity. Many states possess 
the required jurisdictional and substantive provisions to prosecute 
such a case, which they may exercise concurrently. Thus, in the 
situations described above, any lack of deterrence is not the result of 
inadequate codified regulation, but rather a lack of incident reporting 
and law enforcement at sea.  
VI. Establishing Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zone 
In addition to increased accountability for PMSCs, the 
establishment of a Somali EEZ will be a critical step in the transition 
from piracy’s crisis management phase at sea to its sustainable 
solution on shore. Declaring an EEZ is an important step in helping 
Somalia move beyond piracy for several reasons. First, an oft-stated 
motive of the pirates, especially in the early days, was to protect 
Somalia’s maritime resources from illegal fishing and dumping, likely 
caused by international ships.194 Establishing an EEZ would create 
protections over maritime resources, thus removing the need for 
pirates to take protective measures on their own. Second, declaring an 
EEZ is an important first step towards Somalia’s ability to provide 
 
191. CPP, tit. 1, ch. 1, art. 131; 31 MIRC § 131 (Marsh. Is.); LCL, tit. 26, 
ch. 14, § 14.1; MCC, tit. 8, art. 211; BPC, tit. 20, § 289. 
192. CPP, tit. 2, ch. 4, art. 31; LCL, tit. 26, ch. 14, art. 14.1; MCC, tit. 8, 
art. 223; BPC, tit. 7, § 107. 
193. See, e.g., Jonathan Saul, Facing Piracy, Ship Security Firms Set Ethics 
Code, REUTERS (May 9, 2011), www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/09/uk-
shipping-security-piracy-idUSLNE74804X20110509 (discussing how 
deployment of armed teams on ships is a legal grey area); Carolin Liss, 
Privatising the Fight Against Somali Pirates 13 (Murdoch Univ. Asia 
Research Ctr., Working Paper No. 152, 2008) (explaining that PSCs 
providing maritime security often operate in a “grey legal zone”); 
WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 2, at 11 (“[P]rivate guards operate in 
a legal vacuum with no rule of engagement against pirates.”). 
194. See, e.g., Tristan McConnell, Somali Pirates’ Rise Linked to Illegal 
Fishing and Toxic Dumping, GLOBAL POST (Mar. 16, 2012), 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/120306/pirate
s-Somalia-how-it-started%20. 
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for its own maritime security.195 Third, declaring an EEZ is an 
essential move for the Somali people to establish control of their 
maritime resources, thus benefitting from those resources and 
providing alternative livelihoods for would-be pirates. 
This section begins by briefly outlining the character of an EEZ 
as well as the process for establishing an EEZ, both under UNCLOS 
and customary international law. This section then goes on to discuss 
contemporary issues and developments surrounding Somalia’s 
establishment of an EEZ. 
A.  The Legal Character of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
The legal characteristics of a state’s EEZ are thoroughly described 
in Part V of UNCLOS, which establishes a specific legal regime 
governing the zone.196 According to UNCLOS, the coastal state enjoys 
sovereign rights over living and non-living natural resources within its 
EEZ as well as jurisdiction over the establishment of artificial 
structures, scientific research, and the protection of the marine 
environment.197 However, coastal states with EEZs are also obligated 
to respect the rights of other states198 that enjoy the freedom of the 
high seas and certain rights related to the suppression of maritime 
piracy.199 Importantly, UNCLOS also limits the breadth of a state’s 
territorial waters to twelve nautical miles and its EEZ to 200 nautical 
miles.200  
In addition to describing the legal character of the EEZ, UNCLOS 
mentions the steps states must take to establish their EEZs. 
Article 75 of UNCLOS states: 
[T]he outer limit lines of the exclusive economic zone . . . shall 
be shown on charts of a scale or scales adequate for ascertaining 
their position,” and that “[t]he coastal State shall give due 
 
195. Cf. Stein Tønnesson, No Maritime Security Without Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZs) 2 (June 20–21, 2011) (draft paper) (on file with 
Ctr. for Strategic & Int’l Studies), available at http://csis.org/ 
files/publication/110629_Tonnesson_South_China_Sea.pdf (asserting 
that the establishment and delimitation of EEZs in the South China Sea 
is a necessary first step towards maritime security); see Jan 
Stockbruegger, The Mogadishu Roadmap: Towards a Joint Maritime 
Security Policy for Somalia?, PIRACY STUDIES (Oct. 15, 2011), 
http://piracy-studies.org/2011/the-mogadishu-roadmap-towards-a-joint-
maritime-security-policy-for-somalia/ (describing the Mogadishu 
Roadmap’s integration of the EEZ into a maritime security strategy). 
196. See UNCLOS, supra note 57, art. 55, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 418. 
197. Id. art. 56, at 418. 
198. Id. art. 56(2). 
199. Id. art. 58, at 419. 
200. Id. arts. 3, 57, at 400, 419. 
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publicity to such charts or lists of geographical coordinates and 
shall deposit a copy of each such chart or list with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations.201 
Although residual rights related to an EEZ were clarified in 
UNCLOS,202 there is contemporary evidence that an EEZ is also a 
creature of customary international law. First, the UNCLOS 
provisions dealing with an EEZ were the product of decades of 
negotiations around coastal state claims outside territorial waters203 
such that, by the time UNCLOS was signed in 1982, the main 
characteristic of the zone—coastal state sovereignty over natural 
resources within 200 NM that did not rise to full sovereignty—was 
already largely undisputed.204 Second, the International Court of 
Justice explicitly affirmed the proposition that the EEZ provisions of 
UNCLOS reflect customary international law when it stated, “certain 
provisions of the Convention, concerning the continental shelf and the 
exclusive economic zone . . . were adopted without any objections. . . . 
[and should] be regarded as consonant at present with general 
international law on the question.”205 Finally, a number of 
non-signatories to UNCLOS—most notably the U.S.—assert 
jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of UNCLOS, arguing 
that the latter is reflective of customary international law.206 Indeed, 
UNCLOS’ status as customary international law is frequently 
 
201. Id. art. 75, at 428. 
202. Id.  
203. For the earliest example of such a claim, see Proclamation 2667, 10 Fed. 
Reg. 12,303 (Oct. 2, 1945) (referring to President Truman’s 
Proclamation on the Policy of the United States with Respect to the 
Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf). 
204. See BUREAU OF OCEANS & INT’L ENVTL. & SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, LIMITS IN THE SEAS: UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO 
EXCESSIVE NATIONAL MARITIME CLAIMS 44 (1992), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/58381.pdf (“The general 
consensus reached on the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) at the Law of 
the Sea conference as [sic] been supported by state practice since the 
mid-1970s. Thus, the concept of the EEZ, including its maximum 
breadth of 200 miles and the basic rules governing the zone, has been 
effectively established as customary international law.”). 
205. Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine 
Area (Can./U.S.), Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. 246, ¶ 94 (Oct. 12). 
206. See, e.g., BUREAU OF OCEANS & INT’L ENVTL. & SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, 
supra note 204, at 44 (noting that “[t]he exclusive economic zone has 
gained recognition as customary international law” and that UNCLOS 
incorporated these pre-existing customs). 
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advanced as an argument supporting the U.S.’s non-ratification of 
UNCLOS.207 
B.  The Status of Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zone 
Despite the fact that the legal character of an EEZ is clearly 
described in UNCLOS, and states can rely on UNCLOS provisions 
even absent ratification, there has been significant uncertainty around 
the steps Somalia must take to establish an EEZ. This confusion 
relates primarily to the uncertainty regarding the status of Somali 
domestic law and differing views as to the steps required for a state to 
declare an enforceable EEZ. 
Common wisdom states that Somalia currently claims 200 NM of 
territorial waters and that such a claim goes beyond Somalia’s rights 
under international law.208 This conception is based on Somalia’s Law 
No. 37, which was passed by the Somali parliament in 1972.209 Despite 
the fact that Somalia ratified UNCLOS on July 24, 1989,210 the view 
expressed by many, including the Adviser to the Secretary-General on 
Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, is that unless 
Somalia’s domestic law conforms with UNCLOS, it “is legally 
deprived of a territorial sea and an exclusive economic zone.”211  
207. See, e.g., Stewart M. Patrick, (Almost) Everyone Agrees: The U.S. 
Should Ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty, THE ATLANTIC (Jun. 10, 
2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/06/-
almost-everyone-agrees-the-us-should-ratify-the-law-of-the-sea-treaty/ 
258301 (“Some have argued that UNCLOS has already become 
‘customary international law,’ and thus the United States has little to 
gain from formal accession.”). 
208. See U.N. Chair of the S.C. Comm. Pursuant to Res. 751 (1992) & 1907 
(2009), Letter dated July 12, 2013 from the Chair of the Security 
Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 751 (1992) & 1907 (2009) 
Concerning Somalia & Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, Annex 5.5 ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. S/2013/413 (July 12, 2013) (“Since 
1972, Somalia has claimed an extension of its territorial sea from 12 to 
200 nautical miles. However, article 3 of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) limits coastal States to 
claim a maximum territorial sea of 12 nautical miles from the coast.”); 
Thilo Neumann & Tim René Salomon, Fishing in Troubled Waters – 
Somalia’s Maritime Zones and the Case for Reinterpretation, 16 
INSIGHTS (Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2012, at 2, 
available at http://www.asil.org/insights120315.cfm (“[A]s the 1972 
Somalian territorial sea claim contravenes public international law, and 
since there is no Somalian EEZ legislation in place, the Somalian 
government arguably lacks exclusive fishing and fishery management 
rights in the waters off the Somalian coast.”). 
209. Law No. 37 on the Territorial Sea and Ports, arts. 1, 3 (1972) (Somal.), 
available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONAND 
TREATIES/PDFFILES/SOM_1972_Law.pdf.  
210. Chronological Lists, supra note 179. 
211. Lang Report, supra note 31, ¶ 89. 
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Yet this view has become somewhat problematic in light of recent 
developments. In late 2012, the potential existence of a law passed 
subsequent to Law No. 37 that aligns Somalia’s maritime zones to the 
norms established in UNCLOS came to light.212 Two legal documents 
that have recently been uncovered suggest that Law No. 37 has 
indeed been superseded.  
The first legal instrument is Decree no. 14 of the 9th February: 
1989.213 Article 2 of this document states that “[UNCLOS] and its 
Annexes shall have the force of Law in the Territory of the Somali 
Democratic Republic.”214 Decree no. 14 makes reference to “[t]he Law 
no. 11 of the 9th of February 1989 on the base [sic] of which the 
People’s Assembly has approved the Convention specified in this 
Decree.”215 In May 2013, Law no. 11 was found in a file box in 
Mogadishu.216  
At 256 pages in length, Law no. 11 is written in Somali and was 
being translated as of June 2013, but that which has been translated 
thus far appears to bring Somali law in conformity to UNCLOS. 
Article 4(3) of Law no. 11 states that the “[w]idth of the Somali Sea 
Shall be 12 Nautical Miles Drawn from the baseline towards the 
direction of the Sea.”217 Article 7 states that “[t]he Exclusive 
Economic Zone of the Somali Republic shall extend to 200NM drawn 
from the baseline Sea,”218 and goes on to declare its rights over 
natural resources, the power to supervise exploitative activities 
occurring within the EEZ, and other rights provided for in 
UNCLOS.219 Most laws passed by the Assembly prior to 1991 are still 
applicable in Somalia,220 so Law no. 11 of 1989 could still be in force 
today. 
Despite this recently unearthed evidence, the status of Somalia’s 
EEZ remains unclear. A chief cause of the uncertainty is the Somali 
Federal Government’s continuing reliance on Law no. 37 of 1972, as 
illustrated by a press release dated June 6, 2013 from the office of the 
 
212. Robert McLoughlin, UNODC, Somali EEZ (Legal Status): Briefing Note 
for 19 June 2013, ¶ 4 (on file with the author) [hereinafter UNODC 
Brief]. 
213. Decree no. 14: Instrument of Ratification (Feb. 9, 1989) (Somal.), 
available at http://www.somalilandlaw.com/Ratification_of_UNCLOS_ 
1989_Eng_Som.pdf. 
214. Id. art. 2. 
215. Id. pmbl. 
216. UNODC Brief, supra note 212, ¶ 7. 
217. Law no. 11, art. 4(3) (Feb. 9, 1989) (Somal.). 
218. Id. art. 7. 
219. Id. 
220. UNODC Brief, supra note 212, ¶ 4. 
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Prime Minister entitled “Somali Federal Government clarifies its 
position on territorial waters.”221 That press release somewhat 
confusingly states: “[t]he government’s position is Somali Law No. 37 
on the Territorial Sea and Ports, signed on 10 September 1972, which 
defines Somali territorial sea as 200 nautical miles and continental 
shelf. On 24th July 1989 Somali ratified the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea.”222 However, this statement appears in the context of 
other declarations regarding a memorandum of understanding 
between Somalia and Kenya with respect to maritime boundary 
delimitation.223 It is therefore unclear whether the Prime Minister’s 
statement regarding Law no. 37 was truly meant to reiterate a claim 
to a 200 NM territorial sea as opposed to an EEZ, or if the statement 
spoke more to the delimitation issue with Kenya.  
Regardless, the state of the Somali EEZ is far from certain. If 
consensus is reached that Law no. 11 of 1989 and Declaration no. 14 
of 1989 are valid law, the Somali government would merely have to 
publish the coordinates of its EEZ and submit those coordinates to 
the Secretary-General to be fully in compliance with UNCLOS.224 If 
for whatever reason the developments from 1989 are disregarded and 
Law no. 37 of 1972 stands, Somalia will likely have to conform its 
laws to UNCLOS for international recognition of its EEZ. Yet the 
ultimate goal of the Somali people should be clear even if the path 
towards reaching that goal is uncertain. Somalia should take the steps 
necessary to declare the largest EEZ allowable under UNCLOS. 
Somalia will then be integrated into the agreed-upon system for 
establishing an EEZ, at which point it could resolve any delimitation 
issues it might have with neighboring states.  
VII. Applicable Legal Framework 
Legal issues pertaining to PMSCs and the EEZ have already been 
discussed. Thus, this section focuses on legal frameworks, especially 
those in the pertinent provisions of UNCLOS, the 1988 SUA 
Convention, and other conventions relating to piracy. 
UNCLOS, which retains the provisions of the 1958 High Seas 
Convention225 as they relate to piracy, provides the legal framework to 
address piracy issues. Several other international conventions and 
 
221. Somalia: Somali Federal Govt Clarifies Position on Territorial Waters, 
SHABELLE MEDIA NETWORK (June 6, 2013), http://allafrica.com/ 
stories/201306070252.html.  
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. See UNCLOS, supra note 57, art. 75, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 428. 
225. 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 178, arts. 13–22, 450 U.N.T.S. 
at 90–92. 
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some Security Council and General Assembly resolutions also 
contribute to this framework. UNCLOS provides the modern 
definition of piracy, under which “any illegal acts of violence or 
detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by 
the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft,” 
constitutes piracy.226 The geographic limits are that such an act must 
take place on the high seas or outside the jurisdiction of any state and 
must be directed against another ship or aircraft or the persons or 
property on board such a vessel.227 This definition makes no reference 
to either an attempt to commit an act of piracy or to conspiracy 
related to such an act, but it does include voluntary participation or 
facilitation.228 Additionally, if criminal acts constituting piracy occur 
inside the territorial waters of a state, they are not covered by the 
UNCLOS definition but are called “armed robbery at sea” or “armed 
robbery against ships.”  
Under the IMO definition of “armed robbery against ships,” the 
following acts are covered: (1) “any illegal act of violence or detention 
or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of 
piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or 
against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s 
internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea;”229 and 
(2) “any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described 
above.”230 
Under Article 105 of UNCLOS, any state is authorized to seize a 
pirate ship or aircraft and its property on board, arrest the crew, and 
prosecute them through its own courts, so long as the seizure takes 
place on the high seas or on waters outside the jurisdiction of any 
 
226. UNCLOS, supra note 57, art. 101, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 436. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. Code of Practice, supra note 54, Annex ¶ 2.2.1; see also 1988 SUA 
Convention, supra note 58, arts. 3–5, 1678 U.N.T.S. at 224–26 
(containing similar language to the IMO definition of armed robbery at 
sea). 
230. Code of Practice, supra note 54, Annex ¶ 2.2.2. The Code of Practice 
adopts the UNCLOS definition of piracy. Id. ¶ 2.2.1. Earlier, in 
November 2001, the Twenty-Second Assembly of the IMO adopted a 
similar definition of “armed robbery against ships” as “any unlawful act 
of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, 
other than an act of piracy, directed against a ship or against persons or 
property on board such ship, within a State’s jurisdiction over such 
offences.” Compare IMO, Code of Practice, supra note 54, ¶ 2.2.2, with 
Int’l Maritime Organization [IMO], Code of Practice for the 
Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against 
Ships, IMO Assemb. Res. A. 922 (22) (Nov. 29, 2001). 
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state.231 Only war ships, military aircrafts, or those on government 
service are authorized to undertake such seizures.232 These ships are 
also authorized “the right of visit,” in which there are reasonable 
grounds for suspecting that a ship is engaged in piracy.233 This right is 
an exception to the principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction over 
ships in the high seas under Articles 92 and 94 of UNCLOS.  
It should be noted that the state action mentioned above is also 
authorized within the state’s own EEZ.234 Under Article 105 of 
UNCLOS, any country can execute universal jurisdiction over piracy 
regardless of the nationality of the suspected offenders, pirate ship or 
aircraft, victims, or victims’ ship or aircraft. However, it does not 
make it obligatory for the states to take action.235 Many provisions of 
UNCLOS relating to the repression of piracy, especially universal 
jurisdiction under Article 105, reflect customary international law, but 
a state needs to implement this universal jurisdiction permitted by 
international law into its domestic law. Thus, the problem lies not in 
the jurisdictional issues but in the lack of implementation of the 
universality principle through national legislation for a state’s courts 
to assume jurisdiction over piracy cases.  
Other pertinent conventions under which some acts of piracy may 
be considered offenses include the 1988 SUA Convention,236 which was 
primarily intended to apply to acts of terrorism, the 1979 Convention 
Against the Taking of Hostages,237 and the U.N. Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime.238  
The 1988 SUA Convention fills the gaps left by the rather limited 
definition of piracy under UNCLOS by not requiring that two ships 
be involved and by making no distinction between maritime areas.239 
 
231. UNCLOS, supra note 57, art. 105, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 437. 
232. Id. art. 107, at 437. 
233. Id. art. 110, at 438. 
234. Id. art. 58, at 419. 
235. Id. art. 105, at 437 (providing that every state “may” seize a pirate ship 
if it is on the high seas or outside the jurisdiction of any state). 
236. 1988 SUA Convention, supra note 58, arts 3–5, 1678 U.N.T.S. at 224–26 
(specifying crimes at sea that could include piracy). 
237. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, opened for 
signature Dec. 18, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 206 (entered 
into force June 3, 1983) [hereinafter Hostage Convention]. 
238. U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime art. 5, 
Nov. 15, 2000, T.I.A.S. No. 13,127, 2225 U.N.T.S. 275 [hereinafter 
Organized Crime Convention] (criminalizing participation in an 
organized criminal group). 
239. 1988 SUA Convention, supra note 58, arts. 3–4, 1678 U.N.T.S. at 224–
26. 
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Under Article 3, state parties are to establish a number of criminal 
offenses, most of which correspond, at least in part, with actions 
committed by pirates or armed robbers. The Convention also requires 
state parties to make the offenses set forth in Article 3 punishable by 
appropriate penalties “tak[ing] into account the grave nature of those 
offenses.”240 It especially directs states to establish their jurisdiction 
over the offenses set forth in Article 3 when the offense is committed: 
“(a) against or on board a ship flying the flag of the State at the time 
the offense is committed; (b) in the territory of that State, including 
its territorial sea; or (c) by a national of that State.”241  
The Convention also authorizes non-state parties to establish 
jurisdiction when the person “seized, threatened, injured or killed” is 
that state’s national and when the act is intended to “compel that 
State to do or abstain from doing any act.”242 Furthermore, the 
Convention obligates the state, in whose territory the alleged offender 
is present, to establish jurisdiction and prosecute the alleged offender 
if it does not extradite the offender to one of the states that has 
established jurisdiction.243  
In 2005, the state parties to the 1988 SUA Convention adopted a 
Protocol to the Convention that extensively amended the Convention 
by adding new offenses aimed at combating terrorism, thus updating 
its legal framework.244 It also added a new article outlining the 
procedures for a state party requesting the flag state of a suspect 
vessel for its authorization to board and search that vessel, its cargo, 
and persons on board, thus providing the necessary legal basis for 
states to intercept acts of piracy.245  
The 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of 
Hostages defines the offense of taking of hostages, as follows:  
Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure 
or to continue to detain another person . . . in order to compel a 
third party, namely, a State, an international intergovernmental 
organization, a natural or juridical person, or a group of 
persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or 
 
240. Id. art. 5, at 226. 
241. Id. art. 6(1). 
242. Id. art. 6(2). 
243. Id. arts. 6(4), 10–11, at 227, 229. 
244. Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, opened for signature Feb. 
14, 2006, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.15/21 (entered into force July 28, 
2010). 
245. Id. art. 8(2) (adding Article 8bis to the 1988 SUA Convention). 
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implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the 
offence of taking of hostages . . . .246 
States parties to this convention are required to criminalize hostage 
taking as well as attempts to commit or participate in hostage taking, 
and to make these offenses “punishable by appropriate penalties 
which take into account the grave nature of those offenses.”247 
The U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 
sets out offenses that could also be relevant to acts of piracy.248 Under 
Article 5, the Convention requires states parties to criminalize, as a 
distinct offense, the participation in an organized criminal group. It 
also requires states parties to criminalize the conversion or transfer of 
proceeds of crime for the purpose of concealing or disguising their 
illicit origin or the true nature or source of the proceeds of crime.249 
Moreover, while states are also required to impose penalties for the 
offenses mentioned, they also must take into account the gravity of 
each offense.250 
VIII. Recommendations 
Fortunately, the immediate crisis phase of Somalia-based piracy 
appears to be coming to an end. Although many of the stakeholders 
engaged in combating the scourge have had their mandates extended 
through 2014,251 uncertainty remains. For if those mandates are not 
further extended, the fear is that without the active participation of 
the broader international community, responsibility will fall to the 
regional nations to carry the burden themselves. Unless the regional 
nations effectively counter piracy, the problem will not go away. 
However, an optimist could argue that over the past several years as 
norms have been established and institutions have been developed, 
this is the appropriate time to implement a sustainable solution on 
shore. 
An important aspect of the transition from crisis management at 
sea to a sustainable solution on shore is to continue cost-effective 
suppression at sea while capacity is built within Somalia. At this 
 
246. Hostage Convention, supra note 237, art. 1, 1316 U.N.T.S. at 207. 
247. Id. art. 1.  
248. Organized Crime Convention, supra note 238, art. 5, 2225 U.N.T.S. at 
276–77. 
249. Id. art. 6, at 277. 
250. Id. art. 11, at 280. 
251. E.g., Mission, EU NAVFOR, http://eunavfor.eu/mission (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2014); NATO’s Counter Piracy Mission Extended, NATO 
(Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_85230. 
htm. 
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stage, it appears that private armed security will be a major part of 
that interim suppression, making the regulatory efforts described in 
Part V—namely, improved incident reporting—critical to a 
sustainable transition.252 
What major elements are needed for capacity building on shore to 
establish the rule of law? As experience tells us, the piracy for ransom 
business model favored by Somalia-based pirates requires merchant 
ships to be anchored a few miles from the Somali coast—well within 
its territorial waters—for many months while pirates negotiate a 
ransom payment.253 Accordingly, using law enforcement to create a 
more secure environment where pirates are unable to operate 
undisturbed so close to shore for long periods of time would do a great 
deal to dismantle the pirate business model. Another important 
aspect of a sustainable solution to Somalia-based piracy is the 
development of credible alternative livelihoods for the pirates 
themselves.254  
Achieving these twin aims of improving law enforcement capacity 
and creating economic opportunities along the Somali coast will 
require a comprehensive strategy that takes into account Somalia’s 
complex politics. One such strategy is currently being developed 
among the Federal Government and the regions of Somaliland, 
Puntland, and Galmudug, which have come together to develop a 
Maritime Security and Resource Management Strategy under the 
auspices of the Kampala Process.255 The process, facilitated by 
UNPOS, UNODC, IMO, and the U.N. Food and Agriculture 
Organization works to devise a comprehensive strategy to enhance 
maritime security and resource management for the benefit of the 
Somali people.256 The international community would do well to 
support such a strategy, as it is the surest way to establish the 
conditions along the Somali coastline that can best hinder piracy’s 
ability to thrive. Not surprisingly, part of the strategy includes 
establishing a Somali EEZ. 
 
252. See supra pp. 24–30.  
253. See WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 2, at 6–7. 
254. For a comprehensive report on the re-integration of Somali pirates, see 
INGVILD MAGNÆS GJELSVIK & TORE BJØRGO, CTR. FOR PEACE STUDIES, 
UNIV. OF TROMSØ, EX-PIRATES IN SOMALIA: DISENGAGEMENT PROCESSES 
AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMMING 20 (2013) (describing the 
Alternative Livelihood to Piracy Project, which involves, among other 
things, training for jobs in electricity, carpentry, and masonry). 
255. See Kampala Process: A Draft Somali Maritime Strategy – 
Communiqué No. 1, U.N. POL. OFFICE FOR SOMAL. (Mar. 14, 2013), 
http://unpos.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=MLbR1KovAkA
%3D&tabid=11461&language=en-US. 
256. Id.  
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An additional challenge in combating Somali piracy is that some 
leaders and financiers of these piracy groups, who constitute part of 
the land-based criminal networks, reside outside Somalia. Thus, to 
disrupt the pirate money flows, they need to be apprehended and 
prosecuted, with their operations shut down. For this to happen, 
Michiel B. Hijmans and his colleagues urge the international 
community to work with the F.B.I., Europol, and INTERPOL to take 
on these networks.257 
In short, the goal of the international community moving forward 
must be to break the pirate business model.258 This goal is best 
accomplished through enhancing the rule of law along the Somali 
coastline while simultaneously working to provide alternative 
livelihoods to would-be pirates. While these onshore efforts are 
underway, suppression at sea must continue in a manner that is both 
cost-effective and in line with international legal norms. These goals 
will not be easy to achieve, as lawlessness, poverty, and a lack of good 
governance are all major impediments. Nonetheless, the international 
community has spent billions of dollars over the past five years 
treating the symptoms of Somalia-based piracy. Only through a 
sustainable solution on shore will those funds not have been spent in 
vain. 
IX.  Conclusion 
As the discussion above shows, Somalia-based piracy has declined 
due to an effective treatment of the symptoms by the shipping 
industry, navies, international organizations, and private security 
companies. Yet the underlying causes of piracy—lawlessness and a 
lack of economic opportunity in Somalia—remain unchanged, 
rendering the hard-fought gains made to date reversible. Additionally, 
the rise of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and its persistence in 
Southeast Asia show that global piracy will continue to be a menace. 
Many of the required norms and institutions necessary to develop 
a sustainable solution on shore are in place, but the effectiveness of 
their implementation remains to be seen. In the end, a sustainable 
solution will require coordination on the international, regional, 
 
257. Michiel B. Hijman et al., Shutting Down the Piracy Business, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 31, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/08/01/opinion/global/ 
shutting-down-the-piracy-business.html?_r=0&pagewanted-print.  
258. Jason Straziuso, Piracy Group: Make Sure Somali Pirates Aren’t Paid, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 12, 2012), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ 
piracy-group-make-sure-somali-pirates-arent-paid; Peter Apps, Out of 
Sight, Somali Piracy Fight Gets Rougher, REUTERS (Feb. 21, 2012), 
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bilateral, and national levels. Only then will moving from crisis 
management to a sustainable solution to maritime piracy be possible. 
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